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ABSTRACT 
 
We develop a unified growth theory for the Western Hemisphere during the colonization era.  
We posit a unified growth model with transatlantic migration and slavery trade to reconcile 
development in the Thirteen Colonies/United States during AD1700-AD1860.  Then we apply the 
model across American regions/countries, and propose the GeoPopulation-Institution hypothesis to 
explain divergence: whenever its geographic or political environments relatively favored the 
buildup of Black slaves (or non-White forced labor), through slavery institution that 
disincentivized the Blacks to make improvements, a region/country was likely to suffer a reversal 
of fortune.  Geography, population and institution are inseparable in understanding American 
economic history. 
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“We can send from here [West Indies] in the name of the Holy Trinity, all the slaves and 
brazilwood that can be sold.” (Christopher Columbus 1498, 59) 
 
“Free labor has the inspiration of hope; pure slavery has no hope.” (Abraham Lincoln 1859, 
160) 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
We need a unified growth theory for the Western Hemisphere.  This paper investigates how 
geography, population and institution fostered the evolution of European settlement, African 
slavery import and the standard of living in the New World economies during the colonization 
era.1  The discovery of America by Christopher Columbus in AD1492 initiated the Atlantic 
European powers’ (Spain, Portugal, England, France, and the Netherlands) exploration and 
colonization of the American continents.  For the purpose of exploiting economic opportunities or 
spreading political and religious influences, these European powers either encouraged internal 
migration or traded African slaves to promote settlement in the American land.  Due to the 
difference in legal status between European migrants and African slaves, the population structure 
constituted from these two sources had implications on economic progress.  With this background, 
it is our central thesis to reconcile development and divergence (reversal of fortune) in the 
American continents during the colonization era within a unified growth framework. 
Reversal of fortune refers to the reverse in relative per capita incomes between two locations.  
It can occur on two levels: within-country and across-countries.  One within-country example 
took place in the United States.  The southern part of the United States (hereafter US-South) was 
originally richer than the northern part (hereafter US-North); however, this situation had been 
reversed by AD1840.  Lindert and Williamson (2013, 752) suggested that “the decline of frontier 
super-returns, institutional failure, or exceptionally severe damage incurred in the Revolutionary 
War” were possible reasons for the relative decline of US-South. 
Reversal of fortune also occurred at country level.  For example, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru 
were once the most developed regions in America in AD1500.  However, they are among the 
poorest countries in America today.  On the other hand, the United States and Canada were the 
most underdeveloped areas in America in AD1500, but now they are among the richest countries 
in the world (Maddison 2008).  There are two main hypotheses explaining countries’ long-run 
economic development: the geography hypothesis and the institutions hypothesis.  The 
geography hypothesis (Montesquieu 1899[1748]; Marshall 1895) emphasized the role of 
geographic factors, such as climate and resources, in affecting people’s vigor and strength, and 
1  Colonization of America began with the arrival of Christopher Columbus in AD1492.  
American decolonization started with the American Revolution in AD1775.  By AD1860 most 
American countries had gained independence from the European powers.  In this paper, 
“colonization era” refers to the period AD1492-AD1860.  Slavery was an important labor market 
institution characterizing this period.  Christopher Columbus and Abraham Lincoln are two 
representative figures defining the opening and closing of slavery in America.  See the quotes 
ahead of the Introduction. 
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hence the country’s prosperity.  However, since geographic factors are fixed over time, it seems 
that the geography hypothesis fails to account for the halfway relative income reverses in America.  
Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) favored the institutions hypothesis; in the American context settler 
mortality and/or initial prosperity of a newly colonized region would influence the type of 
institutions European powers introduced to it and hence its economic fortune.  We argue that 
geography and institutions are not mutually exclusive and yet complementary.  In particular, the 
literature has in general not addressed the ways in which geography and institutions are linked 
through population structure to account for American development history (section 2).  We 
propose the GeoPopulation-Institution hypothesis (Figure 1) to establish the linkage.  Our 
hypothesis embodies three claims: 
1. Geographic factors, such as disease environment, soil and climate, and land abundance, 
would affect the willingness of Whites to migrate and the use of Black slaves in 
American regions/countries.2 
2. Corresponding to the above willingness, domestic labor scarcity and political 
environment, transatlantic migration and slavery trade took place.  The White-Black 
population structures in those regions/countries would be determined. 
3. The slavery institution in America removed the incentive for Black slaves to improve 
their work.  Hence a greater proportion of Black slaves in the population would have 
an adverse impact on technological progress and economic growth. 
Our ultimate aim is to show this hypothesis explains development and divergence in American 
landscapes during the colonization era. 
 INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
This paper is mainly divided into two parts.  In the first part (sections 4-5), we develop a 
unified growth model which can replicate demographic-economic development in the Thirteen 
Colonies/United States during the colonization era.  We construct a unified growth model with 
transatlantic migration and slavery trade (section 4).   The model is distinct from traditional 
unified growth models (Galor and Weil 2000; Galor and Moav 2002) in two aspects, which are 
highly relevant to American development history (section 2.3).  On the demography side, ours 
incorporates migration and slavery trade which can raise population stock within a region/country 
in ways other than natural increase.  On the production side, technological progress depends on 
population composition compartmentalized by institution: slavery institution destines the Black 
slaves to not own property rights over their labor and wealth, therefore removing the Blacks’ 
incentive to learn and improve their work; ceteris paribus, a greater Black population share implies 
slower technological progress (population composition effect on technological progress).  We 
will also study the model’s implications for territorial expansion and transatlantic slavery trade 
abolition in regard to the United States’ development process (section 5). 
 In the second part (sections 6-7), we apply the model to explain the reversal of fortune 
across American regions/countries during the colonization era (Lindert and Williamson 2016; 
Engerman and Sokoloff 1997).  By calibrating the unified growth model to the historical 
2 In this paper, the term “migration” or “migrants” refers to the voluntary White (European) labor 
flows from Europe to America, but not to the involuntary Black (African) labor flows from Africa 
to America. 
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experience of the United States and West Indies, we replicate the reversal of fortune within the 
United States (section 6) and among the two regions/countries (section 7.1).  The region/country 
cursed by the reversal of fortune was characterized by slow natural population growth, low 
willingness of White migration, and small slavery trade cost.  Then we put forward the 
GeoPopulation-Institution hypothesis to account for these parameter differences – albeit its higher 
initial productivity, the cursed region/country possessed unfavorable geographic factors that 
discouraged White migration (or encouraged the use of Black slaves).  The colonial producers 
resorted to importing Black slaves if there was small political pressure against this.  Through the 
population composition effect on technological progress, this hampered the region/country’s 
economic progress in the long run.  We will also apply the model and hypothesis to explain the 
relative economic decline of former Spanish colonies (section 7.2). 
Our theory also implies that, after the abolishment of slavery institution in America by the 
late-nineteenth century, the population composition effect on technological progress would 
vanish. 3   Thereafter, regions/countries with larger production scale would enjoy faster 
technological progress, making a reversal of fortune less likely to occur.  Hence the early Great 
Divergence pattern among American regions/countries emerged by the late-nineteenth century 
persists till today (section 8.2). 
 The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section reviews the relevant literature.  Section 3 
discusses the historical backgrounds.  Section 4 develops the benchmark model to study the 
development process in the Thirteen Colonies.  Section 5 expands it to the Extended Model and 
studies the effects of territorial expansion and transatlantic slavery trade abolition on the United 
States’ development.  Section 6 applies the Extended Model to US-North and US-South, and we 
put forward the GeoPopulation-Institution hypothesis to account for the reversal of fortune 
between the two regions.  Section 7 applies the model and hypothesis to explain the reversal of 
fortune across American countries.  Section 8 highlights some discussion.  Section 9 concludes. 
 
 
2 RELATED LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Geography hypothesis versus Institutions hypothesis 
The geography hypothesis and the institutions hypothesis aim to explain the divergent growth 
experience across countries.  There are at least three versions of the geography hypothesis.  The 
first focuses on climate.  Climate can affect individual work effort and productivity.  For 
example, Montesquieu (1899[1748], 221-224) and Marshall (1895, 276) stated that people are 
more vigorous under cold climates.  A related aspect is the disease environment.  Sachs and 
Malaney (2002) posed that, malaria-endemic countries suffer from slower economic growth, 
3  Note the distinction between transatlantic slavery trade abolition and slavery institution 
abolishment.  The former refers to the prohibition of slavery imports from other countries, while 
the latter refers to freeing of slaves within a country.  For example, in the United States, 
transatlantic slavery trade was abolished in AD1807, while slavery institution was repealed only in 
AD1865.  In this paper, the term “slavery trade” refers to transatlantic slavery trade but not to the 
internal slavery trade within a country. 
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because malaria adversely affects saving and investment, health and worker productivity, and so 
forth.  Weil (2013, 467) mentioned that, because protohumans evolved in tropical areas in Africa, 
there was ample time for local parasites to develop and attack humans there, making Africa a less 
healthy and unproductive region. 
The second focuses on natural topography.  Adam Smith (1994[1776], 20-21) mentioned the 
importance of access to sea-coast and navigable rivers to a nation’s market widening and 
development.  Bloom et al. (2003) found that countries with favorable geography (cool, coastal 
countries with high, year-round rainfall) are more likely to escape from a poverty trap.  Diamond 
(1997, 366, 407) advanced that, in addition to Eurasia’s head start and wild animal and plant 
species, the east-west orientation of Eurasia has facilitated the diffusion of animals, plants, people, 
ideas and technology across the continent, because of the similar latitude and climate.  On the 
contrary, the north-south orientation of America and Africa posed barriers to diffusion because of 
the changes in latitude and ecology.  This gave the Eurasians developmental advantage by 
AD1492. 
The third focuses on resource.  This turns our attention to the resource blessing versus 
resource curse debate.  For the blessing side, Levine (1987, 97) and Pomeranz (2000, 267) argued 
that the Industrial Revolution started in Britain because “England is built upon an underground 
mountain of coal”, and its access to continental North American food supply brought on the rise of 
English manufactures.  Habakkuk (1962, 12-13, 104-106) stated that land abundance and the 
resulting labor scarcity in the United States encouraged entrepreneurs to search for labor-saving 
innovations; this led to the rise of the American System of Manufacturers and rapid industrial 
progress in the United States during the nineteenth century.  For the curse side, empirical 
evidence indicated that resource-abundant countries tended to grow slower in the recent decades 
(Sachs and Warne 1997; van der Ploeg 2011, 380).  One explanation for this is the Dutch disease, 
where the blooming resource sector would lead to deindustrialization through real exchange rate 
appreciation (Corden and Neary 1982); via learning-by-doing this could contribute to long-term 
welfare loss (Krugman 1987). 
The institutions hypothesis takes a rival view against “geography is destiny”.  North (1990, 
3) defines institutions as “rules of the game in a society” that shape human interaction.4  North 
and Thomas (1973, 1-2) stated that efficient economic organization, which entails the 
establishment of institutional arrangements and property rights that provide economic initiatives, is 
the key to economic growth.  Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argued that nations fail because of 
the existence of extractive political institutions, which incur extractive economic institutions that 
create entry barriers and unfair regulations, impeding economic progress for the masses.  In 
contrast, societies that feature inclusive political institutions give rise to inclusive economic 
institutions, which secure property rights and promote entrepreneurship, and hence economic 
4 Adam Smith (1994[1776], 484-485) stated that, the wealth of society equals the exchangeable 
value of the whole produce of its industry.  Free market system, led by the “invisible hand”, 
would align the interests of individuals with the society.  It is the individual’s endeavors to purse 
activities that are most highly valued by the others, that create the greatest wealth of the society.  
Hayek (1963[1960], 231) mentioned that freedom of economic activity under the rule of law (“free 
system”) would make continuous growth of wealth and technological knowledge possible. 
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growth.  Hall and Jones (1999) found evidence that institutions and government policies drive 
cross-country differences in capital accumulation, productivity and per worker output. 
The institutions hypothesis has been applied to account for the reversal of fortune across 
American countries.  For example, North et al. (2000) stated that, in post-Revolutionary United 
States, the credible system of limited government based on the full separation of powers had laid 
the cornerstone of political order and market-preserving federalism, providing the basis for 
long-run growth.  In contrast, in colonial Spanish America, the Crown focused on short-term 
resource exploitation, leaving its colonies with little experience in autonomous governance, 
leading to political disorder and poor economic performance after their independence.  Engerman 
and Sokoloff (1997) proposed that it was the interplay between resource thrust or inequalities and 
the governmental policies toward maintaining them that shaped economic divergence among 
American countries.  For the within-United States divergence, they proposed that US-South 
lagged behind US-North in evolution of political and economic institutions that promoted 
widespread commercialization and market development, causing the region’s relative decline in 
the nineteenth century. 
In the recent years, the institutions hypothesis has confronted the geography hypothesis in 
econometrics fronts.  Acemoglu et al. (2001) raised that Europeans were more likely to establish 
extractive institutions in colonies where they faced higher settler mortalities.  Such institutions 
were persistent and adversely affected long-run economic performance.  They used European 
settler mortality rates as an instrument for current institutions in their per capita GDP regressions, 
and found that geography variables, such as latitude, lose significance once institutions are 
controlled for.  They viewed this as evidence in favor of the institutions hypothesis over the 
geography hypothesis.  Employing similar procedures, Easterly and Levine (2003), Rodrik et al. 
(2004) arrived at the same conclusion. 
Sachs (2003) criticized the operationalization of geography variables in the above works; in 
particular there are too few geography variables to capture overall geographic characteristics, 
subjecting the regressions to the risk of omitted-variable errors.  Also, the dependent variable of 
the regressions in the above works was contemporaneous income level instead of growth rate of 
the economy across time.  Once growth rate of per capita GDP is used as the dependent variable, 
institutions variable loses significance (Glaeser et al. 2004, 283).5  On the other hand, Albouy 
(2012) doubted Acemoglu et al. (2001)’s results because of data reliability and methodological 
issues (See Acemoglu et al. (2012) for the defense). 
In this paper, we argue that geography and institutions, rather than being crashing views, take 
inseparable roles in understanding American development and divergence from the long-run 
perspective.  Population provides the key linkage between the two (section 6.2). 
 
2.2 Population: Transatlantic migration and slavery trade 
In the recent years, the literature has studied the channels through which population fosters 
long-term development.  For example, Kremer (1993) stated that, since the melting of the polar 
5 Additionally, Glaeser et al. (2004, 295) showed that, even using per capita GDP as the dependent 
variable, institutions variable loses explaining power once human capital is included as another 
explanatory variable in income regressions. 
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ice caps in around 10,000BC, continents with greater land area, and hence larger initial population 
experienced faster technological progress before AD1500.  Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009, 2014) 
proposed that the greater the population genetic distance relative to the world technological 
frontier is, the slower technological diffusion from the frontier and the lower current per capita 
income in a country would be.  Ashraf and Galor (2013) posited that the low genetic diversity of 
native American populations and the high genetic diversity of African populations relative to the 
European and Asian populations, have detrimental effects on development.  Putterman and Weil 
(2010) posed that, history of a population’s ancestors matters more than the history of the place 
they live today in determining their current per capita income.  While reversal of fortune for 
colonized countries as territories is evidential, there is persistence of fortune for people and their 
descendants (Chanda et al. 2014). 
Compared to the above literature, we stress the roles of transatlantic European migration and 
African slavery trade in fostering American development during the colonization era.  Engerman 
and Sokoloff (2013, 101) stated that, “one of the most fundamental consequences of European 
colonization may have been in altering the composition of the populations in the societies 
colonized”.  Easterly and Levine (2015) found a strong positive relationship between European 
share of population during colonization (“Euro share”) and the level of per capita income today in 
non-European countries.  Landes (1998, 311) argued that Spanish America fell in terms of wealth 
relative to British America because the Spanish Crown kept European outsiders away from 
entering its colonies, depriving skill and knowledge progress in Spanish America.  On the other 
hand, American regions/countries where African descendants made up significant population 
shares by the nineteenth century had been cursed by the reversal of fortune. 6  How was 
population structure in an American region/country determined, and how did it affect the 
region/country’s economic fortune?  We will develop a unified growth model with transatlantic 
migration and slavery trade to answer these questions (sections 4.1-4.2).7 
 
2.3 Unified growth theories 
Since the turn of the new millennium, growth economists have shifted their attention to 
explaining long-term development patterns through the unified growth theories.  Galor and Weil 
(2000) and Galor and Moav (2002) suggested that the inherent Malthusian interaction between 
population size/composition and technology level speeds up the pace of technological progress, 
and eventually will lead to industrialization and demographic transition.  The literature has 
evolved to incorporate more structural changes that went along with demographic-economic 
development.  Unified growth models with physical and human capital accumulation (Galor and 
Weil 1996; Galor and Moav 2006), inequality (Galor and Moav 2004; Galor et al. 2009), trade 
6 For example, from Table 1, at the turn of the nineteenth century, African descendants occupied 
more than half of the populations in Barbados (80.7%), Venezuela (62%), Cuba (51%) and Brazil 
(61.2%).  In AD1860, African descendants contributed to about one-third of population in 
US-South (37.7%). 
7  In Africa, there is evidence that historical slavery trade adversely affected economic 
performance today (Nunn 2008).  One channel would be that African Blacks whose ancestors 
were heavily raided during the 400 years of slavery trade are less trusting today (Nunn and 
Wantchekon 2011).   
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(Galor and Mountford 2006, 2008), child labor laws (Hazan and Berdugo 2002; Doepke 2004), 
mortality (Lagerlöf 2003; Voigtländer and Voth 2013), structural transformation (Strulik and 
Weisdorf 2008; Vollrath 2009) and female empowerment (Diebolt and Perrin 2013a, 2013b) have 
been proposed.   
However, in the above works, the role of international labor movement was ignored, and this 
is especially important in early American development history.  In the demography side, the 
native Indians did not contribute to the buildup of population stock in most American countries 
during the colonization era.8  Instead, the population increase came mainly from transatlantic 
migration and slavery trade, as well as the natural increase of the migrated Europeans (Whites) and 
imported Africans (Blacks).  Table 1 reproduces Engerman and Sokoloff (1997)’s population 
composition estimates in selected American regions/countries at different time points during the 
colonization era.  By the turn of the nineteenth century, most of the New World economies were 
populated with Whites and Blacks rather than with Indians.  In the production side, we saw from 
the past subsection that Euro share had a strong positive correlation with economic development 
(Easterly and Levine 2015).  Therefore any unified growth theory aiming to explain long-run 
American development and divergence should take transatlantic movement of European and 
African labor into account (sections 4 and 8.5). 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
In another dimension, relative to the Eastern Hemisphere, there was less work done on 
simulating long-run economic development in the Western Hemisphere using unified growth 
models.  See exceptions from Hansen and Prescott (2002), Doepke (2004), Lord and Rangazas 
(2006) and Mourmouras and Rangazas (2009).  But they either did not specify simulation time 
frames or placed the starting point after AD1800.  This paper focuses on the New World 
economies during the colonization era, in particular AD1700-AD1860 (sections 4.3, 5, 6.1 and 7). 
 
 
3 HISTORICAL CONTENT AND BACKGROUND 
 
Section 3.1 reviews per capita income and demographic development in British America, 
including the reversal of fortune between US-North and US-South, during the eighteenth and 
early-nineteenth centuries.  Section 3.2 documents the reversal of fortune among American 
countries, and overviews the political environments in these countries during the early Modern 
Period.  The historical data will be used to calibrate our models in later sections of this paper. 
 
3.1 Economic development and Population evolution in British America 
3.1.1  The Thirteen Colonies / United States 
Table 2 shows Lindert and Williamson (2016)’s estimates of real per capita income in the 
Thirteen Colonies during AD1650-AD1774.  In this paper, US-North refers to colonies/states 
north of the Mason-Dixon line (New England and Middle Colonies), while US-South to those 
8 Denevan (1992, xxix) postulated that the native Indian population “dropped from about 53.9 
million in 1492 to only about 5.6 million by 1650”, that is, about 90% depopulation rate within 
around 150 years. 
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south of the Mason-Dixon line (Upper South and Lower South).9  New England, which mainly 
traded its fishery and timber products, possessed per capita income levels similar to that of Britain 
and grew slowly throughout AD1650-AD1774.  Middle Colonies, which focused on exporting its 
mixed farming products, was stagnating but possessed higher income levels than New England 
during the eighteenth century.  The Upper South and Lower South, which specialized in tobacco 
and rice production respectively, were much wealthier than the northern colonies throughout the 
colonial period, but were suffering from per capita income declines at the same time. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
During the American Revolution (AD1775-AD1783), the Thirteen Colonies declared 
independence in AD1776 and turned into the United States of America.  Table 3 shows Lindert 
and Williamson (2013)’s estimates of real per capita income growth rate in the Thirteen States 
during the early Republic period (AD1774-AD1840). 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
The Thirteen States suffered from per capita income downswing in the two decades 
following the Revolutionary Wars, with US-South witnessing the sharpest decline.  In the first 
four decades of the nineteenth century, the Thirteen States grew at an impressive average rate of 
1.56% per annum.  US-North, in particular New England, grew much faster than US-South did.  
Combining the estimates from Tables 2-3, Figure 2A depicts real per capita income evolution in 
the Thirteen Colonies/States during AD1650-AD1840.  It reveals the reversal of fortune between 
US-North (solid lines) and US-South (dashed lines): US-North, which was initially poorer during 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, surpassed US-South by AD1840.  Figure 2B shows a 
comparison of income evolution between the Thirteen Colonies/States and Britain during 
AD1650-AD1840.  In general the Thirteen Colonies was wealthier than Britain during the 
colonial period.  The British Industrial Revolution during the late-eighteenth century allowed the 
motherland to outperform the newly established Republic. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
Next we come to Galenson (1996)’s estimates of White-Black population evolution in the 
Thirteen Colonies.  Table 4 shows the White populations in US-North, US-South (and West 
Indies), with the numbers in parentheses denoting the White population share, in each decade 
during AD1620-AD1770.  From the settlement in Jamestown till the eve of the American 
Revolution, the White populations were increasing in both US-North and US-South, with the 
former rising about twice faster than the latter.   
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
The White population growth was mainly fueled by natural increase and transatlantic 
migration.  Table 5 shows the White migration from British Isles to British America in each 
decade from AD1630 to AD1770.  During this time frame, the total number of White migrants to 
US-North was about half that to US-South.  This implies that US-North had a higher natural 
population growth rate.10 
9 Note that the definitions of New England, Middle Colonies, Upper South and Lower South vary 
in our sources (see Tables 2-4).  Unless specified, we will stick to definitions stated in Table 4. 
10 One factor that contributed to the higher natural population growth rate in US-North was the 
lower mortality rate there.  See Table A.1 for Wells (1992)’s estimates of life expectancy among 
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INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 Table 6 shows the Black populations in US-North, US-South (and West Indies), with the 
numbers in parentheses representing the Black population share, in each decade during 
AD1650-AD1770.  Before the AD1680s, the Black populations grew slowly in US-North and 
US-South.  After that, this trend continued in US-North, and the Blacks constituted less than 5% 
of the population in US-North in most of the time.  In contrast, the Black population grew fast in 
US-South.  By the eve of the American Revolution, US-South possessed a Black population 
which was eight times larger than that in US-North, and the Blacks dominated 41% of the 
US-South population.   
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 The Black population growth was mainly fueled by natural increase and transatlantic slavery 
trade.  Table 7 shows the number of Blacks flowing to British America in each decade from 
AD1650 to AD1770.  We interpret the data reflecting the number of African slaves imported to 
British America.11  Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, US-North almost did 
not import slaves.  On the other hand, US-South was importing slaves in every decade except the 
decade of American Revolution.  Throughout these two centuries, the total number of Blacks 
imported to US-South (219,000) was about two-thirds the number of Whites migrating to 
US-South (328,000). 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
3.1.2  Labor market Institutions 
 We briefly review the labor market institutions in British America.  The first was 
indentured servitude.  More than half of British migrants relied on indentured servitude contracts 
to cover the migration expenditure (Allen et al. 2012).  Indentured servitude was a credit system 
where prospective servants paid for their passages to America by signing contracts with recruiting 
agents, promising to work in a particular colony under stated conditions for a specified number of 
years.  The servants would then be shipped to the designated colony.  The recruiting agents 
would sell, in a second market, the contracts to American planters or farmers, who would provide 
maintenance to the servants during the contract terms.  The conditions of the servitude were 
regulated by local American courts.  The servants would be freed after the contracts expired 
(Galenson 1981a). 
 Another labor market institution was slavery.  British America obtained overseas slaves 
through transatlantic slavery trade before the abolitions in the United States and in the British 
selected regions in the Thirteen Colonies/United States during the eighteenth century.  In general 
US-North was a healthier place than US-South and the people there enjoyed longer life 
expectancies. 
11 We interpret all Blacks as slaves in British America during the eighteenth and early-nineteenth 
centuries.  The two are conceptually different, but statistics indicates that they were similar.  For 
example, U.S. Bureau of the Census (1909, Table 60; 1975, series A 6-8)’s data indicated that 18% 
of United States population were slaves in AD1790, which closely matches the 21% nationwide 
Black population share implied by our AD1770 data from Tables 4 and 6.  Similarly, 13% of 
United States population were slaves in AD1860, which closely matches the 14% nationwide 
Black population share in the United States in AD1860 (from our Table 1). 
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Empire in AD1807.  The transported people were usually enslaved, kidnapped and raided 
Africans (Thornton 1996).  Slaves were treated as properties of their owners; their legal status 
involved serving for life as would their progeny (Galenson 1981a).  The British common law did 
not protect slaves from mistreatment by their masters.  In contrast, the slave owners had absolute 
power and authority to force the slaves to work, buy and sell them, use them as collaterals or gifts 
as they wished (Finkelman 2012). 
 
3.1.3  The West Indies 
The West Indies was another region that was characterized by the reversal of fortune, when 
compared to the United States.  Due to data availability, we take Coatsworth (2005)’s per capita 
income estimates for the Caribbean countries to proxy their British West Indies counterparts (Table 
8 in section 3.2.2).  In AD1700, West Indies ($650 in AD1990 dollars) was wealthier than the 
future United States ($527 in AD1990 dollars).  However, the United States ($1,231 in AD1990 
dollars) overtook the West Indies ($636 in AD1990 dollars) by AD1820. 
From the British West Indies panels in Tables 4-7, since the AD1660s up till the eve of the 
American Revolution, the White population in West Indies remained roughly constant (Table 4).  
The same applied to the number of White migrants from British Isles to West Indies (Table 5).  
On the other hand, the Black population in West Indies was increasing over the same time frame, 
and it made up more than 90% of the total population by AD1770 (Table 6).  The Black 
population increase in West Indies was mainly fueled by slavery import (Table 7).12 
 
 
3.2 Economic growth and Political situation in American countries 
3.2.1  Reversal of fortune among American countries 
There is a negative correlation between economic prosperity in AD1500 and today among 
American countries.  Figure 3 depicts the plot of log per capita income in AD2008 against 
urbanization rate in AD1500, which is our proxy for economic prosperity in AD1500, for 22 
American countries.  In general a more prosperous American country in AD1500 would become 
a relatively poor country today.13 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
3.2.2  Economic and political environments in American countries 
We categorize the American countries into three groups: Spanish-type resource-exploitation 
countries, Portuguese-type sugar-exporting countries and United-States-type White-populated 
12 In section 7.1, we will calibrate the White and Black natural population growth rates in British 
West Indies, which are found to be negative during AD1700-AD1780.  Hence, the roughly 
constant White population and increasing Black population must have been supplied by 
transatlantic migration and slavery trade. 
13 Our sample includes 22 countries, namely Argentina (AR), Bolivia (BO), Brazil (BR), Canada 
(CA), Chile (CL), Colombia (CO), Costa Rica (CR), Dominican Republic (DO), Ecuador (EC), El 
Salvador (SV), Guatemala (GT), Haiti (HT), Honduras (HN), Jamaica (JM), Mexico (MX), 
Nicaragua (NI), Panama (PA), Paraguay (PY), Peru (PE), Uruguay (UY), the United States (US) 
and Venezuela (VE). 
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countries.  Table 8 shows Coatsworth (2005)’s per capita income evolution among these three 
groups of countries from AD1500 to AD2000. 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
 Spanish-type resource-exploitation countries refer to the former Spain-ruled American 
colonies.  They made up most of Central America and South America (except Brazil).  In the 
early-sixteenth century, Aztec and Inca, the most advanced civilizations in America at that time, 
were conquered by Spain.  Since then Spain adopted a policy of conquest imperialism.  The 
Aztec and Inca elites and their priesthood were wiped out.  Churches and convents were built to 
replace the old religious regimes.  There was a stringent social distinction between the ruling 
elites and the native Indians.  The former were granted land and indigenous population.  The 
latter had no legal rights, access to land and education, but were to supply forced labor (Maddison 
2003, ch.HS-4; Maddison 2007, ch.2).  To protect the persistence and stability of the elites, Spain 
adopted restrictive migration policies, requiring citizens to meet formidable requirements for 
acquiring permission to move to the New World (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997, 2000).  From 
Table 8, these countries were more prosperous than the future United States in AD1500, but were 
surpassed by the United States by AD1820. 
 Portuguese-type sugar-exporting countries refer to Brazil and the former Caribbean colonies.  
Brazil’s coastline, from Natal to Florianopolis, was suitable for sugarcane cultivation.  During the 
sixteenth century, Portugal developed Brazil into an export economy based on sugar plantation.  
The growing labor scarcity problem increased Portugal’s dependence on African slavery for 
Brazil’s labor supply (Galloway 1989, 71-72).  In the seventeenth century, England, France and 
the Netherlands seized Caribbean islands from the Spanish Empire.  Similar to Portuguese-Brazil, 
Caribbean islands also possessed favorable soils and climates for growing sugar, but thin domestic 
population.  The three European powers copied Portuguese-Brazil’s model of slave-based 
sugar-plantation export-economy to the Caribbean islands (Maddison 2003, ch.HS-4).  Sugar 
brought the Caribbean islands prosperity in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  From Table 
8, the Portuguese-type countries were wealthier than the future United States in AD1600, but were 
surpassed by AD1820. 
 United-States-type White-populated countries refer to the future United States and Canada. 
These places were the most thinly populated areas in America at the outset of the colonization era 
(Acemoglu et al. 2002, Appendix 3).  They were not endowed with rich resources or soils and 
climates that favored the production of staple crops (except tobacco and rice production in 
US-South).  There was hence less demand for importing slavery labor to work in these countries.  
As a result, these countries relied mainly on European migrants and their descendants to supply 
work force (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997, 2000).  From Table 8, although these countries started 
off as the poorest regions in AD1500-AD1600, they became the richest places in America by 
AD1820. 
 
 
4 THE BENCHMARK MODEL (AD1700-AD1780) 
 
In this section, we develop the benchmark unified growth model with transatlantic migration 
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and slavery trade, and simulate the development process of the Thirteen Colonies during the 
eighteenth century.  The model will be extended in different time- and spatial-settings in the next 
three sections. 
 
4.1 Model Setting 
Suppose that the world economy consists of two countries, country A (“colony”) and country 
B (“home”).  Country A is an American colony of an European country B; they are 
geographically separated by the Atlantic Ocean.  Africa is a region where Black slavery labor can 
be obtained.  The “colonial producer” owns the land in country A, while the “home landlord” 
owns the land in country B.  They hire labor to produce, and earn land rents in return.  There are 
two types of individuals: “Whites” (European descendants) and “Blacks” (African descendants).  
Each individual is endowed with one unit of labor which is supplied inelastically.  Time is 
discrete and indexed by 𝑡𝑡.  Each time period spreads for 10 years. 
4.1.1  Demography side 
Europeans in country B enjoy the freedom to migrate to country A.  Following Harris and 
Todaro (1970), we hypothesize that the number of migrants moving from country B to country A at 
time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡, is a positive function of the country A-country B expected wage differential at time 𝑡𝑡: 
(1)  𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚([𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴]𝑒𝑒 − [𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵]𝑒𝑒) , 𝑚𝑚 > 0 , 
where [𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴]𝑒𝑒 and [𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵]𝑒𝑒  are the expected wages in country A and in country B at time 𝑡𝑡 
respectively.14  We interpret 𝑚𝑚 as a measure of willingness to migrate from country B to country 
A; it contains all factors other than wage that affect the number of migrants, for example, mortality 
rate, forms of work organization, racial composition of labor force in American destination 
(Galenson 1981b, 144-145).  We make the rational expectation assumption: the expected wage 
differential at time 𝑡𝑡 ([𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴]𝑒𝑒 − [𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵]𝑒𝑒) equals the actual wage differential at time 𝑡𝑡, (𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 − 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵), 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 and 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 are the wages in the two countries at time 𝑡𝑡.  Hence (1) becomes: 
(2)  𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚(𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 − 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵) . 
Next we come to demographic process in the two countries.  There are two types of 
individuals in country A (colony): the Whites and the Blacks.  The total population size in 
country A at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴, is: 
(3)  𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 = 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹  , 
where 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻 is the White population size in country A at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹  is the Black population size in 
country A at time 𝑡𝑡. 
 The White population size in country A at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻, evolves from two sources: natural 
increase and current transatlantic migration: 
(4)  𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻 = �1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐻𝐻 + 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 , 
where 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 is the exogenous White natural population growth rate in country A, �1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐻𝐻  
14 Harris and Todaro (1970, 129) studied rural-to-urban migration.  They hypothesized that the 
number of migrants moving from rural area to urban area is a positive function of urban-rural 
expected wage differential.  Using their notations: 
 ?̇?𝑁𝑢𝑢 = 𝜓𝜓(𝑤𝑤𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 − 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴), where 𝜓𝜓′ > 0, 𝜓𝜓(0) = 0, 
where ?̇?𝑁𝑢𝑢 is the time derivative of urban population (migration), 𝑤𝑤𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 is the expected urban wage, 
𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴 is the rural wage, 𝜓𝜓(. ) is a positive increasing function.  In our equation (1), we assume 
𝜓𝜓(. ) to take a linear form for simplicity. 
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is the natural increase in White population at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 is the endogenously determined number 
of transatlantic migrants at time 𝑡𝑡.  The White population size in country A at 𝑡𝑡 = 1, 𝐿𝐿1𝐻𝐻, is 
historically given.   
Similarly, the Black population size in country A at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹 , evolves from two sources: 
natural increase and current transatlantic slavery trade: 
(5)  𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹 = �1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐹𝐹 + 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 ,  
where 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 is the exogenous Black natural population growth rate in country A, �1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐹𝐹  is 
the natural increase in Black population at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 is the endogenously determined number of 
Black slaves imported at time 𝑡𝑡.  The Black population size in country A at 𝑡𝑡 = 1, 𝐿𝐿1𝐹𝐹 , is 
historically given. 
There is only one type of individuals in country B (home): the Whites.  We assume that the 
home country would never import African slaves.  The population size in country B at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵, 
equals the natural increased amount minus the number of transatlantic migrants: 
(6)  𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 = �1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐵𝐵 − 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 , 
where 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 is the exogenous natural population growth rate in country B.  The population size in 
country B at 𝑡𝑡 = 1, 𝐿𝐿1𝐵𝐵, is again historically given. 
 To simplify our analysis, we make the small colony assumption.  When the number of 
migrants is much smaller than the population size in country B (home), transatlantic migration 
would hardly affect the population size at home.15  Hence (6) can be approximated by: 
(7)  𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 = �1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐵𝐵  . 
 
4.1.2  Production side 
 The home landlord and colonial producer make production decisions subject to 
technological and institutional constraints.  For production technologies, in country B (home), 
output at time 𝑡𝑡 is produced with Cobb-Douglas technology, using labor and home land as inputs: 
(8)  𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 = 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵)𝛼𝛼(𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵)1−𝛼𝛼 , 𝛼𝛼 ∈ (0, 1) , 
where 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 is technology level in country B at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 is the amount of land in country B. 
Similarly, in country A (colony), output at time 𝑡𝑡 is produced according to Cobb-Douglas 
technology, using labor and colonial land as inputs: 
(9)  𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 = 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴)1−𝛼𝛼 , 𝛼𝛼 ∈ (0, 1) , 
where 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 is technology level in country A at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 is the amount of land in country A.   
For institution, country B possesses free labor market: at each time 𝑡𝑡, by inelastically 
supplying one unit of labor, each White worker earns a wage income of 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵.  The home landlord 
owns land and production technology in country B.  He or she decides how many domestic labor 
to hire to maximize land rent at home, taking home wage as given: 
(10)  max𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 − 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 subject to (8). 
First order condition of (10), together with home labor market clearing implies: 
(11)  𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 = 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 ∙ 𝛼𝛼(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵)𝛼𝛼−1(𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵)1−𝛼𝛼 , 
15 For example, from Maddison (2008)’s estimates, in AD1700, British Isles (United Kingdom and 
Ireland) had a population of about 10 million.  From our Table 5, the average decennial migration 
from British Isles to British America during AD1700-AD1770 was only about 18 thousand, which 
was less than 0.2% of British Isles’ population in AD1700. 
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That is, home wage equals marginal product of home labor at each time 𝑡𝑡.  
Colonial labor market features free White labor and Black slavery: at each time 𝑡𝑡, every 
individual inelastically supplies one unit of labor; in return, each White worker earns a wage 
income of 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 , while each Black worker gets nothing (slavery institution).  The colonial 
producer owns land and production technology in country A, and maximizes the land rent there.  
Besides hiring domestic and migrant workers, he or she possesses one more choice variable: to 
engage in transatlantic slavery trade and import African slaves.  We assume the cost of engaging 
in transatlantic slavery trade is increasing in the number of slaves imported and takes the form of 
𝑓𝑓 ∙ (𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡)2, where 𝑓𝑓 is a positive constant.16  The slavery trade cost parameter 𝑓𝑓 reflects the 
direct cost of engaging in trading activity, as well as political pressure against slavery imports.    
The colonial producer decides the numbers of White labor to hire, and Black slaves to import, 
taking colony wage as given: 
(12)  max𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻 , 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 − 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻 − 𝑓𝑓(𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡)2 subject to (9), (5) , 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻 is the total wage payment to the Whites at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑓𝑓(𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡)2 is the slavery trade cost 
at time 𝑡𝑡.  No wage payment is made to the Blacks for all time 𝑡𝑡.  First order condition of (12), 
together with White and Black labor market clearings in the colony, implies: 
(13)  𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 = 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 ∙ 𝛼𝛼(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼−1(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴)1−𝛼𝛼 , 
(14)  𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 ∙ 𝛼𝛼(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼−1(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴)1−𝛼𝛼 = 2𝑓𝑓𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 . 
Equation (13) means colony wage equals marginal product of Whites in colony, while (14) states 
marginal product of Blacks in colony equals marginal slavery trade cost at each time 𝑡𝑡. 
 
4.1.3  Technological progress 
 Technological progress occurs at home and in the colony in every period.  We assume the 
technology in country B (home) is more advanced than that in country A (colony).  Home 
technological progress comes from learning-by-doing externality during production process 
(Arrow 1962; Matsuyama 1992; Strulik and Weisdorf 2008).17  Technology level in country B at 
time 𝑡𝑡 + 1, 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡+1𝐵𝐵 , is: 
(15)  𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡+1𝐵𝐵 = 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 + 𝜇𝜇𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 ,  𝜇𝜇 > 0 . 
The 𝜇𝜇𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵  term represents learning-by-doing.  The formulation has the implication that an 
increase in factor input would accelerate technology growth.  Technology level in country B at 
𝑡𝑡 = 1, 𝑧𝑧1𝐵𝐵, is historically given.   
 For country A (colony), technological progress comes from two sources: learning-by-doing 
externality during production process and technology diffusion from country B (home).  
Population composition compartmentalized by the slavery institution affects the pace of 
technological progress.  Technology level in country A at time 𝑡𝑡 + 1, 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡+1𝐴𝐴 , is: 
(16)  𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡+1𝐴𝐴 = 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 + 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 ∙ [𝜇𝜇𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 + 𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 − 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)] ,  𝜇𝜇,𝑑𝑑 > 0 , 
16 We assume slavery trade cost takes a quadratic rather than a linear form, otherwise the 
equilibrium system will have an indeterminate solution. 
17 We model technological progress as a result of learning-by-doing rather than R&D.  Crafts 
(1995, 761) stated that during the era of British Industrial Revolution, “Arrow-like learning by 
doing was much more important relative to intentional, profit-seeking R&D than in today's world”. 
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The 𝜇𝜇𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴  term is again the learning-by-doing component.  The 𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 − 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)  term is the 
technology diffusion component, which reflects the advantage of being a relatively backward 
country (Gerschenkron 1962; Nelson and Phelps 1966).  The White population share (or “Euro 
share”) term 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
𝐻𝐻
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴 captures the “social capability” of country A to engage in technological progress 
(Ohkawa and Rosovsky 1973, 212; Abramovitz 1986); that is, how conducive the population in 
country A is to improving technological practice through learning-by-doing and technology 
diffusion.18  We argue that, since the Blacks and their descendants had been deprived of the title 
to their human capital and wealth, they have no incentive to learn and improve their work.19  
Hence, the greater the Black population share, the slower learning-by-doing and technology 
diffusion would be, relative to the full potential rate �𝜇𝜇𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴+𝑑𝑑�𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡
𝐵𝐵−𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴��
𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴 .
20  Technology level in 
country A at 𝑡𝑡 = 1, 𝑧𝑧1𝐴𝐴, is historically given.   
To recap: from (16), ceteris paribus, an increase in the number of European migrants 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 
speeds up colonial technological progress through a production scale effect (via the increase in 
𝜇𝜇𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴 term) and a population composition effect (via the increase in 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
𝐻𝐻
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴 term).  On the other hand, 
ceteris paribus, an increase in imported African slaves 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡  accelerates colonial technological 
progress through the production scale effect, but decelerates it through the population composition 
effect.  The population composition effect on technological progress will be crucial in explaining 
reversal of fortune in American landscapes during the colonization era (sections 6-7). 
 
4.1.4  Per capita income 
Lastly, denote per capita incomes in country A and in country B at time 𝑡𝑡 as 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 and 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 
respectively: 
18 Easterly and Levine (2015) posited that a higher Euro share had lasting positive impacts on 
economic development in colonized countries, because the Europeans brought along with them 
human capital, technology, familiarity with global markets, and political institutions during 
colonization. 
19 Adam Smith (1994[1776], 742) stated that, “[s]laves, however, are very seldom inventive; and 
all the most important improvements … have been the discoveries of freemen.” 
Emerson (1844) declared that “[s]lavery is no scholar, no improver”. 
Fogel and Engerman (1989, 108) posed that, “under the unbridled exploitation of slavery … the 
blacks had little incentive to improve themselves”. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, 75) stated that, “Barbados did not have inclusive economic 
institutions, since two-thirds of the population were slaves with no access to education or 
economic opportunities, and no ability or incentive to use their talents or skills”. 
20 Nelson and Phelps (1966, 73) hypothesized that technology growth of a country takes the form 
of ?̇?𝐴𝑡𝑡 = Φ(ℎ) ∙ [?̅?𝐴𝑡𝑡 − 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡], where 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡  is the country’s technology level at time 𝑡𝑡 , ?̅?𝐴𝑡𝑡  is the 
frontier technology level at time 𝑡𝑡, ℎ is the current level of human capital, Φ(. ) is a positive 
increasing function of ℎ.  Benhabib and Spiegel (1994, 155), Aghion and Howitt (2009, 298) 
stated the technology growth equation in a more general form of ?̇?𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 𝜙𝜙(ℎ) ∙ 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 + Φ(ℎ) ∙[?̅?𝐴𝑡𝑡 − 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡] , where 𝜙𝜙(. ) is another positive increasing function of ℎ , 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡  is the growth rate 
originating from domestic innovation in the country.  Our equation (16) takes a similar form by 
replacing ℎ  by White population share (Euro share) in the economy, replacing 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡  by a 
learning-by-doing term, and assuming Φ(. ) and 𝜙𝜙(. ) to take linear forms. 
Note that the White and Black population shares always sum up to one. 
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(17)  𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 ≡
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴  , and 
(18)  𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 ≡
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡
𝐵𝐵
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
𝐵𝐵  . 
From (17) and (18), we have the standard population dilution effect on per capita income: given 
total output in the economy, a larger population size implies a smaller per capita income for each 
individual. 
 To summarize, the distinctive features of our unified growth model comprise transatlantic 
labor movement, which raises population stock in a country through channels other than natural 
increase (section 4.1.1), and slavery institution, which compartmentalizes the population, 
depriving the Black labor at the cost of overall productivity advancement in the colony (sections 
4.1.2-4.1.3). 
 
4.2 Equilibrium Analysis 
We define the equilibrium growth path of the economy.  The first period of our model is 
indexed by 𝑡𝑡 = 1 , with initial conditions {𝐿𝐿1𝐻𝐻 ,𝐿𝐿1𝐹𝐹 , 𝐿𝐿1𝐵𝐵;  𝑧𝑧1𝐴𝐴, 𝑧𝑧1𝐵𝐵} .  The equilibrium constitutes 
sequences of production variables {𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵;  𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴,𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵}𝑡𝑡=1∞ , technological variables {𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴, 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵}𝑡𝑡=1∞ , 
population variables {𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹 , 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵;  𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 ,𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡}𝑡𝑡=1∞  and wages {𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴,𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵}𝑡𝑡=1∞  which satisfy: 
A) Home landlord and colonial producer rent maximization and labor market clearing: {𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴,𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵,𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡} satisfy (11), (13) and (14) at time 𝑡𝑡. 
B) Output production: Given current technology levels {𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴, 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵}, land and labor inputs {𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴,𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵,𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵}, output in the two countries {𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵} are obtained from production 
functions (9) and (8) at time 𝑡𝑡. 
C) Transatlantic migration: Given wages {𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴,𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵} , number of migrates 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡  is 
determined by (2) at time 𝑡𝑡. 
D) Population evolution: {𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻 , 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹 ,𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵}𝑡𝑡=1∞  evolve according to (3), (4), (5) and (7). 
E) Technology evolution: {𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴, 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵}𝑡𝑡=1∞  evolve according to (16) and (15). 
F)  Per capita income: {𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴,𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵}𝑡𝑡=1∞  are defined by (17) and (18). 
 
Propositions 1 and 2 state two internal adjustment mechanisms in our model: they show how 
technological progress and natural population growth drive the evolution of numbers of migrants 
and imported slaves across time:21 
 Proposition 1 (Technology growth effect on migration and slavery trade): (i) Ceteris 
paribus, technological progress in country A raises the numbers of migrants and slaves imported to 
country A, that is, 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴 > 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 > 0.  (ii) On the other hand, technological progress in 
country B reduces the number of migrants and raises the number of slaves imported to country A, 
that is, 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡
𝐵𝐵 < 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 > 0. 
 Proof:  See Appendix 1. 
21 See Appendix 2 for more details. 
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 Explanation: (i) Technology growth in colony raises colony wage and marginal product of 
Black labor, thereby raising 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 and 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡.  (ii) Technology growth at home raises home wage and 
reduces migrants 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡.  Marginal product of Black labor in colony increases and so 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 rises. 
 
Proposition 2 (Natural population growth effect on migration and slavery trade): (i) 
Ceteris paribus, White natural population growth in country A reduces the numbers of migrants 
and slaves imported to country A, that is, 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1
𝐻𝐻 < 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐻𝐻 < 0.  (ii) Similarly, 
Black natural population growth in country A reduces the numbers of migrants and slaves 
imported to country A, that is, 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1
𝐹𝐹 < 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐹𝐹 < 0.  (iii) On the other hand, 
natural population growth in country B raises the number of migrants and reduces the number of 
slaves imported to country A, that is, 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1
𝐵𝐵 > 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐵𝐵 < 0. 
 Proof:  See Appendix 1. 
 Explanation: (i), (ii) Rising natural population in colony reduces colony wage and marginal 
product of Black labor, thereby lowering 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 and 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡.  (iii) Natural population growth at home 
lowers home wage and increases migrants 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 .  Marginal product of Black labor in colony 
decreases and so 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 falls. 
 
4.3 Calibration and Simulation: the Thirteen Colonies AD1700-AD1780 
 We calibrate the benchmark model and simulate demographic-economic development of the 
Thirteen Colonies during AD1700-AD1780 (section 3.1.1).  We identify country A as the 
Thirteen Colonies and country B as Britain, which includes today’s United Kingdom and Ireland.22  
Parameters and initial conditions are chosen to match historical land areas, population levels and 
growth, income levels and growth in the two countries, as well as migration and slavery import 
into the Thirteen Colonies.  Each model period corresponds to 10 years. 
 Land area: For the Thirteen Colonies, we sum the land areas in today’s Maine, New 
Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina 
provided by U.S. Bureau of the Census (2012, Table 18).  For Britain’s case, we sum the land 
areas of today’s United Kingdom and Ireland provided by the Central Intelligence Agency, or CIA 
(2016).  The land areas of the Thirteen Colonies and Britain are 904,554𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚2  and 310,813𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚2 respectively. 
 Initial population: For the Thirteen Colonies, using the AD1700 data from Tables 4 and 6, 
we take initial White population as 𝐿𝐿1𝐻𝐻 = 240,000, and initial Black population as 𝐿𝐿1𝐹𝐹 = 22,000.  
For Britain, we sum the AD1700 population estimates for the United Kingdom and Ireland 
provided by Maddison (2008) to obtain 𝐿𝐿1𝐵𝐵 = 10,490,000. 
22 Note that we treat United Kingdom and Ireland as one united country in the British Isles.  This 
allows us to match the migration data from Table 5 (the White migration from British Isles to 
British America).  Historically, United Kingdom and Ireland integrated into one country under the 
name of “United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland” during AD1801-AD1922. 
18 
 
                                                      
Income level: From Table 2, we take initial per capita income of the Thirteen Colonies and 
Britain in AD1700 to be 3.45 and 2.06 respectively.  Using (9) and (17), we calibrate 𝑧𝑧1𝐴𝐴 by 
𝑦𝑦1
𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿1
𝐴𝐴 = 𝑧𝑧1𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿1𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴)1−𝛼𝛼.  Similarly, we use (8) and (18) to calibrate 𝑧𝑧1𝐵𝐵.  We get 𝑧𝑧1𝐴𝐴 = 1.64 
and 𝑧𝑧1𝐵𝐵 = 17.0. 
Migration and slavery import: We estimate 𝑚𝑚  by applying (2) to average decennial 
migration during AD1700-AD1770 (Table 5) and the AD1700 per capita income (Table 2); we 
found 𝑚𝑚 = 84,532 . 23   Similarly, from (13) and (14), 2𝑓𝑓𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 = 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 .  We use the average 
decennial slavery import during AD1700-AD1770 (Table 7) and the AD1700 per capita income 
(Table 2) to calibrate 𝑓𝑓; we obtain 𝑓𝑓 =  0.0000226. 
Population growth: We assume constant natural population growth rates in the two 
countries.  For the Thirteen Colonies, applying the White population accumulation equation 
𝐿𝐿8
𝐻𝐻 = �1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�7𝐿𝐿1𝐻𝐻 + 𝑀𝑀8 + �1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝑀𝑀7 + ⋯+ �1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�6𝑀𝑀2  to AD1700-AD1770 data in 
Tables 4 and 5, we back out 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0.23.  Similarly, applying the Black population accumulation 
equation 𝐿𝐿8𝐹𝐹 = �1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�7𝐿𝐿1𝐹𝐹 + 𝑄𝑄8 + �1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝑄𝑄7 + ⋯+ �1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�6𝑄𝑄2  to AD1700-AD1770 
data in Tables 6 and 7, we obtain 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 = 0.22.  For Britain, Maddison (2008) only provided 
population estimates for the United Kingdom and Ireland in AD1700 and AD1820, which are 
8,565,000 and 21,239,000 respectively.  Use 𝐿𝐿13𝐵𝐵 = �1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵�12𝐿𝐿1𝐵𝐵 to get 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 = 0.086. 
 Income growth: For the Cobb-Douglas production function parameter, we follow Vollrath 
(2009) to set 𝛼𝛼 = 0.4.  We calibrate the learning-by-doing parameter 𝜇𝜇 = 3.9 × 10−8 to match 
per capita income growth trend in Britain, and the technology diffusion parameter 𝑑𝑑 = 0.03 to 
match per capita income growth trend in the Thirteen Colonies (Figure 2B) during 
AD1700-AD1770. 
 Table 9 summarizes the benchmark parameters and initial values: 
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE 
 Figure 4 (blue solid lines) depicts the benchmark simulation result.  It shows the evolution 
of (a) per capita income in the Thirteen Colonies, (b) technology growth rate in the Thirteen 
Colonies 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡+1𝑧𝑧
𝐴𝐴
≡
𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡+1
𝐴𝐴 −𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴
𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴 , (c) White population share in the Thirteen Colonies, (d) number of 
White migrants to the Thirteen Colonies, (e) number of Black slaves imported to the Thirteen 
Colonies, and (f) per capita income in Britain during AD1700-AD1780.  The (blue) dots indicate 
the data points implied from Tables 2-7. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
Now we give an account of the development process in the Thirteen Colonies.  Throughout 
AD1700-AD1780, there were faster technological progress and natural population growth in the 
23 Note that our Cobb-Douglas production function formulation implies that 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 = 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 and 
𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡
𝐵𝐵 = 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵.  Also, we use average decennial migration during AD1700-AD1770 instead of the 
decennial migration during AD1700-AD1710 to sort out the fluctuations in number of migrants 
during the eighteenth century. 
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Thirteen Colonies than in Britain.24  The technology growth effect (proposition 1(i)) and natural 
population growth effect (proposition 2(i), (ii)) generate opposite forces and roughly offset each 
other, so that the numbers of migrants and slavery import stayed at roughly constant levels 
throughout AD1700-AD1780 (panels (d)-(e)).  In the Thirteen Colonies, the transatlantic labor 
movement contributed to the gradual decline in White population share (panel (c)), exerting a 
negative population composition effect on technological progress (panel (b)). 25   Finally 
population dilution effect dominated the effect of technological progress, leading to per capita 
income decline throughout AD1700-AD1780 (panel (a)).  In contrast, in Britain, technological 
progress was fast enough to make up for the population dilution effect, and hence per capita 
income gradually rose (panel (f)).  Still, per capita income gap, and hence the wage gap, between 
the Thirteen Colonies and Britain was positive throughout AD1700-AD1780, inducing continuous 
migration from Britain to the Thirteen Colonies. 
 To summarize this section, we constructed a benchmark model that replicates 
demographic-economic development in the Thirteen Colonies during AD1700-AD1780 (arrows 
2-3 in Figure 1). 
 
 
5 THE EXTENDED MODEL (AD1700-AD1860) 
 
We extend the benchmark model to study the importance of United States’ land acquisition 
and slavery trade abolition on its development process up till AD1860.26  In AD1776 the Thirteen 
Colonies broke away from the British Empire, and established the United States of America.  The 
United States Constitution permitted free migration into and within the newly established Republic, 
and banned transatlantic slavery trade in AD1808 (Engerman and Margo 2011).  Before the 
American Civil War in AD1861-AD1865, the United States was rapidly expanding its territories 
westwards. 
 
5.1 United States Land Acquisition  
Table 10 shows the total land area of the United States from AD1776 to AD1860. 
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE 
The three most significant United States land acquisitions during AD1776-AD1860 were the 
Treaty of Paris which marked the end of American Revolution in AD1783, the Louisiana Purchase 
from Napoleonic France in AD1803 and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo which concluded the 
Mexican-American War in AD1848.  Since its independence, the United States has enlarged its 
24 From our simulation, technology level of the Thirteen Colonies grew by a factor of 3.5 during 
AD1700-AD1780, while in Britain technology level only grew by a factor of 1.5 during 
AD1700-AD1780.  Together with 𝑧𝑧1𝐴𝐴 = 1.64 and 𝑧𝑧1𝐵𝐵 = 17.0, these validate our assumption that 
home technology was more advanced than colony technology within the simulation time frame 
(section 4.1.3). 
25 Otherwise, without transatlantic labor movement, the roughly same magnitude of 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 and 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 
would not lead to a drop in White population share in the Thirteen Colonies. 
26 Engerman and Margo (2011, 310) suggested that “the best way to evaluate the impact of the 
Constitution and associated legislation is through general equilibrium analysis, possibly with a 
dynamic component”. 
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land territories by 8.5 times its initial size by AD1860. 
 One of the most important features of United States land acquisition was that territory was 
expanded over sparsely-populated land.  Turner’s famous frontier thesis in AD1893 stressed this: 
“The existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American 
settlement westward, explain American development.” (Turner 1976[1920], 1) 
The frontier or free land refers to geographic regions with “a low man-land ratio and unusually 
abundant, unexploited, natural resources” (Billington 1966, 25).27  While Turner (1976[1920])’s 
emphasis was on the role of frontier in promoting individualism, democracy and nationalism, ours 
is on the demographic-economic impact of such rapid increases in United States’ natural resource 
base.28 
 For the demographic impact, theoretically, such land expansions would increase the marginal 
products of White and Black labor, encouraging White migration and Black slavery import to the 
United States.  Proposition 3 states this result: 
Proposition 3 (Land acquisition effect on migration and slavery trade): Ceteris paribus, 
land expansion in country A raises the numbers of migrants and slaves imported to country A, that 
is, 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴
> 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴
> 0. 
 Proof:  See Appendix 1. 
For the economic impact, we extend the benchmark model in three dimensions.   First, the 
new time frame spreads from AD1700 to AD1860, rather than from AD1700 to AD1780.  Second, 
we include three periods of permanent “land shocks” to capture the three aforementioned United 
States land expansions: we assume the colony land area 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 to be raised by factors of 864,746
349,250, 
1,681,828
864,746  and 2,940,0421,681,828 in AD1790, AD1810 and AD1850 respectively.  Third, we modify the 
technological progress equations (15) and (16) by adding a quadratic learning-by-doing term to 
capture the acceleration of British per capita income growth during the early-nineteenth century 
(British Industrial Revolution): 
(19)  𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡+1𝐵𝐵 = 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 + 𝜇𝜇1𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 + 𝜇𝜇2(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵)2 , 𝜇𝜇1,𝜇𝜇2 > 0 , 
(20)  𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡+1𝐴𝐴 = 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 + 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 ∙ [𝜇𝜇1𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 + 𝜇𝜇2(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)2 + 𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 − 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)] ,  𝜇𝜇1,𝜇𝜇2,𝑑𝑑 > 0 . 
Note (20) implicitly assumes that the Black population still did not have incentive to learn and 
improve work till the eve of the American Civil War.29  We recalibrate 𝜇𝜇1, 𝜇𝜇2 and 𝑑𝑑 to match 
27 Turner (1976[1920], 3) emphasized that the “most significant thing about the American frontier 
is, that it lies at the hither edge of free land … which has a density of two or more [settlement] to 
the square mile”. 
28  Findlay and Lundahl (1994, 70) and Barbier (2011, xiv) noted that, the analysis of 
frontier-based development “has been used extensively by historians and geographers for a wide 
variety of times and places, but has been neglected by economists.’’ 
29 Even though the northern states in the United States had abolished slavery by AD1804, Litwack 
(1961, 15) stated that, until the post-Civil War era, the public minds in both US-North and 
US-South continued to “[hold] conviction that the African race was inferior” and discriminated 
against the Blacks “politically, socially, and most certainly physically”.  We make the extreme 
assumption that the Blacks were still not incentivized to improve their work before AD1860, to 
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per capita income growth trends in Britain and in the Thirteen Colonies/United States during 
AD1700-AD1860.  Table 11 summarizes the parameters and initial conditions that we will use in 
this subsection. 
INSERT TABLE 11 HERE 
Figure 5 depicts the simulated development paths of the Thirteen Colonies/United States 
with land acquisition (red dashed lines, parameters from Table 11) and without so (blue solid lines) 
during AD1700-AD1860.  As proposition 3 predicts, the United States land acquisition during 
AD1776-AD1860 raised the numbers of British migrants (panel (d)) and imported African slaves 
(panel (e)) when compared to the benchmark case.30  Through a production scale effect on 
technological progress (panel (b)), the United States grew along a superior per capita income path 
(panel (a)). 
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE 
 The above results rely on the “free land” assumption.  In our model, if the newly acquired 
lands had instead been densely-populated with native Indians and the United States had treated 
them like African slaves, then the United States would not have grown as fast as it had in the “free 
land” case.  The counterfactual experiment (green dotted lines) in Figure 5 illustrates this: we 
rerun the extended model using parameters from Table 11, with an additional assumption that the 
Black population size would increase exogenously by the same proportions as land area expanded 
during the three land shock periods (AD1790, AD1810 and AD1850).  Per capita income would 
rise more slowly in this case (panel (a)) due to the adverse population composition effect on 
technological progress (panel (b)), as well as the population dilution effect on per capita income. 
The above exercises illustrate that geography and population matter in accounting for 
American economic growth.  It was the “free land” abundance that allowed the United States to 
outpour its population across the continent, and take advantage of production scale effect on 
technological progress.  Although our simulation stops in AD1860, it is not difficult to realize 
that this type of economies of scale would eventually allow the United States to overtake and 
retain its technological lead over Britain.31  This is reflected in Wolff (1991, 568)’s total factor 
productivity estimates, where the United States overtook Britain in the AD1900s and has retained 
its lead thereafter. 
 
simplify our analysis. 
30 However, one fact that our model (Figure 5, panel (d)) fails to reproduce is the continuous rise 
in migration from the British Isles to the United States since the AD1820s, in particular the sharp 
increase during the AD1840s and AD1850s (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, series C89-119).  
The long-term rise originated from transatlantic transportation improvement, while the sharp 
increase during the AD1840s and AD1850s was likely to be caused by deteriorating economic 
conditions in Europe due to the potato famines (Haines 2000, 197-198). 
31 We conjecture that similar reasoning applies to Australia and Canada, two other “Great 
Frontier[s]” in world history (Webb 1952, 10), which retained their aggregate productivity lead 
over Britain since the AD1860s and AD1950s (Broadberry and Irwin 2007, 267; Wolff 1991, 568).  
To explain the lack of good economic outcomes in Latin American countries which also possessed 
frontiers in the nineteenth century, García-Jimeno and Robinson (2011, 53) proposed the 
“conditional frontier thesis”, which states that the impact of the frontier are conditional on the 
existing political institutions.  They found evidence for the thesis using economic and political 
data from 21 American countries. 
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5.2 United States Slavery Trade Abolition 
We next investigate the impact of slavery trade abolition.  The United States Congress 
began to regulate slavery trade in AD1794.  In AD1800, it dramatically raised fines for illegal 
citizen participation in slavery trade, and awarded the officers and crews who made the slavery 
trade seizure the right to the value of the vessel.  In AD1803, new fines were introduced for 
people who brought slaves or any "negro, mulatto, or other person of color" into states that banned 
slave importation.  In AD1807, the Congress passed the Act Prohibiting Importation of Slaves, 
where fines and imprisonment were raised to high enough levels that discouraged most slave 
smugglers (Finkelman 2012, 120-121).  In terms of our model, these raised the slavery trade cost 
parameter 𝑓𝑓 .  Proposition 4 states how an increase in slavery trade cost parameter affects 
transatlantic migration and slavery trade. 
Proposition 4 (Slavery-trade-cost-increase effect on migration and slavery trade): 
Ceteris paribus, an increase in slavery trade cost parameter raises the number of migrants and 
reduces the number of slaves imported to country A, that is, 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
> 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
< 0.   
 Proof:  See Appendix 1. 
Theoretically, the increase in slavery trade cost parameter 𝑓𝑓 reduces slavery import.  This will 
increase marginal product of White labor and hence their wage in the colony (when compared to 
the case of no rise in 𝑓𝑓), thereby attracting more White migration to the colony. 
 We extend the model in section 5.1 to study the demographic-economic impact of the 
Prohibiting Act.  Consider an exogenous rise of slavery trade cost parameter 𝑓𝑓  to a 
prohibitively-high level 𝑓𝑓 = 1 from AD1810 onwards, to reflect the implementation of the 
Prohibiting Act.  Table 12 shows the parameters and initial conditions we employ in this 
subsection. 
INSERT TABLE 12 HERE 
Figure 6 depicts the simulated development paths of the Thirteen Colonies/United States 
with slavery trade abolition (red dashed lines, parameters from Table 12) and without abolition 
(blue solid line, parameters from Table 11) during AD1700-AD1860.  For the demographic 
impact, after the Prohibiting Act was established, slaves flowing into the United States dropped to 
zero by construction (panel (d)).  However, the responding increase in White migration was quite 
modest (panel (c)).  The number of White migrants followed pretty much the same path with or 
without slavery trade abolition. 
INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE 
 Similarly, for the economic impact, the Prohibiting Act did not have a significant impact on 
subsequent per capita income growth (panel (a)).  The reason was that the positive population 
composition effect on technological progress, originating from a smaller Black population share, 
was nullified by the negative production scale effect on technological progress caused by the 
smaller total labor input in the United States (panel (b)).  Hence slavery trade abolition happened 
to occur in the United States history at a time when its main developmental impact was to slow 
down the Black population stockpile.32 
32 Our model does not capture one effect of slavery trade abolition: expecting the Congress to 
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 To summarize this section, we examined the impacts of land acquisition and slavery trade 
abolition on development process in the United States.  The two cases also illustrated how 
geography and policy affected economic outcomes through the population channel (arrows 1-2 in 
Figure 1).  We refer to the calibrated model in this subsection (Table 12) as the Extended Model.  
Now we are ready to tackle the divergence issues (reversal of fortune) within the United States and 
across American countries. 
 
 
6 REVERSAL OF FORTUNE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 
 
In section 6.1 we simulate the demographic-economic evolution in US-North and US-South 
during AD1700-AD1860.  In section 6.2 we put forward the GeoPopulation-Institution 
hypothesis to explain the reversal of fortune between the two regions. 
 
6.1 Simulation: US-North and US-South AD1700-AD1860 
 To apply the Extended Model to US-North (with subscript N) and US-South (with subscript 
S), we consider the world economy consisting of three regions/countries: US-North, US-South and 
Britain, the former two being American colonies of Britain.33  Assume there is no inter-colonial 
migration between US-North and US-South, then we can directly apply the Extended Model to the 
two pairs of home-colony dyads: Britain-US-North and Britain-US-South.  We modify (20) as: 
(21)   𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡+1𝐴𝐴 = 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 + �𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�3 ∙ [𝜇𝜇1𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 + 𝜇𝜇2(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)2 + 𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 − 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)] ,  𝜇𝜇1,𝜇𝜇2,𝑑𝑑 > 0 , 
in this subsection.  The White population share term 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
𝐻𝐻
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴 is raised to the third power.  This 
strengthens the population composition effect on technological progress, which is required to 
reconcile the divergence of per capita income between US-North and US-South in AD1840 
(Figure 2A, Figure 7 panel (a)).  The calibration procedures are similar to those in section 4.3 and 
we leave it in Appendix 3.  Table 13 displays the calibrated parameters and initial conditions. 
INSERT TABLE 13 HERE 
Inspecting Table 13, the most important structural differences between US-North and 
US-South lie in the divergence of natural population growth rates (𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0.29, 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻 = 0.24 
and 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0.15, 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻 = 0.21 ), British willingness to migrate ( 𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁 = 369,048  versus 
𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆 = 18,870) and slavery trade cost parameter (𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁 = 0.000436 versus 𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆 = 0.0000402). 
 Figure 7 depicts the simulated development paths for US-North (blue solid lines) and 
US-South (red dashed line) during AD1700-AD1860, with the (blue) dots and (red) crosses 
prohibit international importation of slaves, slave traders might have increased slavery imports and 
driven up slave prices before the Prohibiting Act was implemented in AD1807 (Mancall et al. 2001; 
Engerman and Margo 2011). 
33 Before AD1780, the definitions of US-North and US-South follow from Table 4.  After 
AD1780, we assume that the land areas of US-North and US-South would be enlarged by the same 
factors as the total land area of the United States did in Table 10. 
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representing their respective data points implied from Tables 2-7.  US-South was initially more 
prosperous than US-North (panel (a)), thanks to its higher starting productivity.  Despite the 
higher starting wages in US-South, the higher British willingness to migrate to US-North 
translated into a roughly parity in numbers of British migrants to US-North and to US-South in the 
eighteenth century, as well as a greater number of British migrants to US-North in the 
early-nineteenth century (panel (d)).  At the same time, the higher slavery trade cost parameter in 
US-North prior to AD1810 discouraged the import of African slaves to US-North (panel (e)).  
Consequently, the White population share was in general rising in US-North and falling in 
US-South (panel (c)).  Through population composition effect on technological progress, 
US-North enjoyed a faster technology growth during AD1700-AD1860 (panel (b)), allowing it to 
overtake US-South in terms of per capita income level in around AD1820 (panel (a)). 
INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE 
After the overtake, US-South was still suffering from slow technology growth due to its 
persistently low White population share (panel (c)), and its per capita income was stagnating in the 
remaining simulation periods.  In contrast, per capita income growth in US-North had gained 
momentum well into AD1860, thanks to its high White population share which was conducive to 
technological progress (panel (b)). 
 Our next question is what accounts for the three structural parameter differences (lower 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 
𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿
𝐹𝐹, 𝑚𝑚, 𝑓𝑓 in US-South), which in turn explains the divergence between US-North and US-South.  
More generally, these parameter differences will also show up in another group of American 
countries that suffered from relative economic decline (West Indies in section 7.1).  We argue that, 
accounting for these differences is crucial to the understanding of reversal of fortune in American 
economic history.  In the next subsection we propose the GeoPopulation-Institution hypothesis to 
provide an explanation. 
 
6.2 The GeoPopulation-Institution Hypothesis 
 The GeoPopulation-Institution hypothesis, as its name suggests, highlights the interplay 
among geography, population and institution in explaining American development and divergence 
during the colonization era (Figure 1).  The core content of the hypothesis is that, whenever its 
geographic or political environments relatively favored the buildup of Black slaves (or more 
generally, non-White forced labor), through slavery institution that disincentivized the Blacks to 
make improvements, an American region/country was likely to be cursed by the reversal of fortune.  
From our calibration in the previous subsection, the region being cursed by the reversal of fortune 
(US-South) possessed low natural population growth rates (𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻 < 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻 ), low 
European willingness to migrate (𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆 < 𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁) and low slavery trade cost parameter (𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆 < 𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁).  
We will argue how the GeoPopulation-Institution hypothesis explains these parameter differences. 
 Figure 8 depicts the breakdown of GeoPopulation-Institution hypothesis, which can be split 
into three components: the geography channel, the population channel and the institution channel. 
INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE 
 For the geography channel, disease environment, soil and climate suitability for growing 
staple crops affected mortalities and life expectancies, generating different degrees of 
attractiveness to potential European settlers and the use of African slaves among American 
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regions/countries.  The warm and humid climate of US-South was hospitable to malaria, yellow 
fever and hookworm, continuing to threaten the local health environment (Savitt and Young 1988, 
ch.2-4; McCandless 2011, ch.3).  Making the health problem worse in the lowcountry area was 
that the factor endowments there fostered rice cultivation, putting laborers to work under a 
rigorous regime (Galenson 1981b, 154-156).  These made US-South an unhealthy place, as 
reflected by the shorter life expectancies when compared to US-North (Table A.1).  Hence 
US-South possessed a slower natural population growth (𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻  < 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 , 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻 ) and 
discouraged Europeans from immigrating (𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆 < 𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁).  On the other hand, the Africans “had 
developed better biological defenses against the troublesome parasites” (Rutman and Rutman 1976, 
35; Silver 1990, 160), making them an attractive labor choice in the plantation complex in 
US-South (𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆 < 𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁).34  Summarizing this channel, low natural population growth rates would 
be associated with low European willingness to migrate and small slavery trade cost parameter. 
 For the population channel, corresponding to the willingness of European migration and the 
use of slaves created by the geography channel, as well as domestic labor scarcity and political 
environment, transatlantic migration and slavery trade took place and shaped the demographic 
process.  In US-North, the “hostility” of White labors rendered the use of Black slaves 
“unprofitable” (𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆 < 𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁) (Litwack 1961, 6).  Taking European willingness to migrate (𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁, 𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆), 
slavery trade cost parameter (𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁, 𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆) and domestic labor scarcity into account, colonial producers 
would make decisions on White labor hiring and Black slavery import to maximize their rents, 
altering population size and composition in the colonies (sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2).  Colonial 
producers would import more African slaves if White labors were scarce, or if it was less costly to 
import African slaves.35  That means, low European willingness to migrate and low slavery trade 
cost parameter would lead to the relative buildup of Black slaves in US-South.  By the eve of the 
American Revolution, these turned US-South into a settlement region characterized by a higher 
Black population share (Table 6).  In addition, two geographic factors – initial productivity (𝑧𝑧1𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁, 
𝑧𝑧1
𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆) and land abundance (𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁, 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆) would also contribute to population evolution.36  Ceteris 
paribus, the higher initial productivity or the larger land area was, the more Europeans migrating 
for the higher colony wage and slaves being imported by the colonial producer would be; this 
speeded up the population stockpile. 
 For the institution channel, the change in White-Black population mix would affect 
economic growth through the population composition effect on technological progress (section 
4.1.3).  The slavery institution deprived the Blacks from the rights to property and choice of work, 
and disincentivized them from learning, innovating and making improvements (Smith 1994[1776]; 
34 This might also be one reason contributing to the higher Black natural population growth rate 
than the White’s in US-South in Table 13.  In contrast, in US-North, the winters there might have 
been “unfavourable to the African constitution”, making the Whites a preferred labor choice to the 
Blacks (Litwack 1961, 4). 
35 Galenson (1981b, 149-156; 1984) stated that, from the mid-seventeenth to eighteenth centuries, 
facing the short supply and rising relative price of English servants, colonial planters in West 
Indies, the Chesapeake, South Carolina, and Georgia turned from White servants to Black slaves 
as the primary source of bound labor. 
36 Before American industrialization, productivity mainly refers to whether the land could grow 
valuable crops for sale.  For example, US-South was blessed with fertile soil, long, warm and 
humid summers, making it suitable for growing cash crops (tobacco, rice, indigo, cotton, etc.). 
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Emerson 1884; Fogel and Engerman 1989; Acemoglu and Roberson 2012).  In contrast, White 
labors, who usually came in the form of indentured servants, retained basic legal rights during the 
indenture period and were set free after the indenture expired (section 3.1.2).  The wage the free 
Whites earned would encourage them to propagate their work.37  Therefore the greater the Black 
population share was, the slower technological progress would be.  The relative buildup of Black 
slaves in US-South was detrimental to economic progress in the long run and eventually caused 
the region’s relative decline. 
We emphasize again, in our GeoPopulation-Institution hypothesis, that natural geography, 
population structure and slavery institution are integrated components in explaining development 
and divergence in the United States (sections 4.3, 5 and 6).  Without geography, we could explain 
neither the relative growth of the Black population in US-South (disease environment and 
soil/climate suitability for staple crops) nor the United States eventually overtaking Britain in 
terms of technology and economy (resource abundance in the United States).  Without slavery 
institution, we could not account for the reversal of fortune between US-North and US-South 
(disincentivized Blacks in learning and improving).  The population channel provides one key 
linkage through which geography and institution interact to foster American development and 
divergence during the colonization era.  In our model, geographical differences and slavery 
institution are both exogenous, and population evolution illustrates one channel by which 
geography could affect economic growth.  This channel has not been considered in Acemoglu et 
al. (2001) and Rodrik et al. (2004)’s instructmental regression analyses (section 2.1), which might 
pose issues on their instrument exogeneity assumptions and the conclusions derived from them.38 
 To summarize this section, our unified growth model simulated demographic-economic 
evolution in US-North and US-South, and replicated the reversal of fortune between the two 
regions.  We proposed the GeoPopulation-Institution hypothesis to account for the calibration 
results. 
 
 
7 REVERSAL OF FORTUNE ACROSS AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
 
In this section we illustrate how the unified growth model and the GeoPopulation-Institution 
hypothesis reconcile the decline of the once prosperous Portuguese-type sugar-exporting countries 
(section 7.1) and Spanish-type resource-exploitation countries (section 7.2) relative to 
United-States-type White-populated countries (section 7.3). 
37 Adam Smith (1994[1776], 93) stated that, “[t]he liberal reward of labour, as it encourages the 
propagation, so it increases the industry of the common people.  The wages of labour are the 
encouragement of industry, which, like every other human quality, improves in proportion to the 
encouragement it receives.” 
38 Acemoglu et al. (2001, 1378) posited the following regression model to estimate the effect of 
current institutions on current per capita income (𝛽𝛽): 
 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 =  𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 . 
They employed settler mortality as an instrument for current institutions, and performed two stage 
least square regressions.  For settler mortality to be a valid instrument for current institutions, it 
should not affect current per capita income through channels other than its effect on current 
institutions.  However our GeoPopulation-Institution hypothesis now suggests one such channel. 
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 7.1 Portuguese-type Sugar-exporting countries 
 Portugal began to develop sugar industry in Brazil since the AD1520s.  Sugar plantation 
operated with a large scale of labor force.  In Brazil, on average each engenho (sugar plantation 
with mills) had about 100 slaves.  Initially the industry relied on local Indian labor supply.  
Since the AD1570s, facing continuing Indian resistance, spread of plagues that reduced the Indian 
population, as well as the Crown and Church’s opposition to the enslavement of Indians, Portugal 
increased its reliance on African slaves to supply labor in Brazil.  By the AD1600s Black slaves 
became the dominant labor force (Schwartz 1978; Galloway 1989, ch.4).  Soon Brazil became 
the leading world sugar exporter, blessing its northeast part as one of the most prosperous regions 
in the world.  However by the close of the seventeenth century, the centers of sugar production 
had shifted to the Caribbean islands and Brazil stagnated (Edel 1969). 
Since the AD1620s Britain, France and the Netherlands began to seize the Caribbean islands 
from the Spanish Empire.  The Sugar Revolution in Barbados in the AD1640s raised expectations 
of sugar profit, and these European powers quickly converted their Caribbean Antilles to sugar 
production areas.  Due to their closer proximity to European and North American markets, these 
islands became very wealthy and prosperous (Higman 1996, 301; Gomez-Galvarriato 2006; 
Maddison 2007, ch.2); they were among the richest regions in America in the AD1700s (Table 8).  
The Caribbean islands were so prosperous and strategically important that they have been 
described as “the pawn of European power politics, the cockpit of Europe, the arena of Europe's 
wars hot and cold” (Williams 1970, 69).  However, the relative prosperity of West Indies did not 
last into the nineteenth century.  The United States and Canada had overtaken them by AD1820.  
What accounted for the relative decline of the cockpit of Europe? 
 Similar to section 6, we first calibrate our unified growth model (Extended Model) to the 
West Indies data, and reveal its parameter differences when compared to the Thirteen 
Colonies/United States.  For land area, we sum total land area of the islands being identified as 
“West Indies” in Table 4, provide by CIA (2016).  For initial per capita income, in AD1700 West 
Indies was 650
527
 times wealthier than the future United States (Table 8).  We set West Indies and 
the Thirteen Colonies/United States’ AD1700 initial per capita incomes to 650
527
× 3.45 = 4.26 and 3.45 respectively.  The other parameters are calibrated in similar fashions as those in Appendix 3.  
Table 14 shows the calibration results.39 
INSERT TABLE 14 HERE 
 Comparing the calibrated parameters in West Indies and in the Thirteen Colonies/United 
States, the structural differences are the poorer demographic performance in West Indies (negative 
𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿
𝐻𝐻 and 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 in West Indies versus positive  𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 and 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹  in the other), the lower European 
willingness to migrate to West Indies (𝑚𝑚 = 35,096 in West Indies versus 𝑚𝑚 = 84,532 in the 
other) and the smaller slavery trade cost parameter in West Indies (𝑓𝑓 = 0.00000781 in West 
39 Note that the parameter values in the Thirteen Colonies/United States panel in Table 14 are 
identical to those in Table 12. 
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Indies versus 𝑓𝑓 = 0.0000226 in the other). 
 Figure 9 depicts the simulated development paths for the Thirteen Colonies/United States 
(blue solid lines) and West Indies (red dashed lines) during AD1700-AD1860.  Reversal of 
fortune between the two regions occurred by AD1790 (panel (a)).  Before that, the higher 
productivity level in West Indies made it a wealthier region.  However, the lower European 
willingness to migrate and the smaller slavery trade cost parameter in the West Indies maintained 
the high Black population share in the sugar Antilles (panel (c)).  Due to its smaller production 
scale and less conducive population composition to technological progress (panel (b)), the West 
Indies was eventually surpassed by the United States.  Since then the originally blooming Antilles 
has fallen from its past prosperous grace.40 
INSERT FIGURE 9 HERE 
 Now we apply the GeoPopulation-Institution hypothesis (Figure 8) to account for the “lower 
𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿
𝐻𝐻, 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 , 𝑚𝑚, 𝑓𝑓” in West Indies.  First, for the geography channel, diseases such as malaria, 
yellow fever, tetanus and dysentery were more prevalent and virulent in tropical climates than in 
temperate ones, turning West Indies into a “demographic disaster area” (Fogel and Engerman 1989, 
26; Dunn 1972, 334).  Also, the combination of fertile soil and tropical climate in West Indies 
favored cane sugar cultivation (Sheridan 2000[1974], 14), which was characterized by high fixed 
capital requirement and efficiently operated under the gang labor system.  The high mortality 
rates and tough working conditions under the gang system made Europeans avoid this region 
(Galenson 1981b, 150-151; 1984).41  For political environment, prior to AD1783, Williams (1964, 
39) mentioned that, “all classes in English society … in general, supported the slave trade”.  The 
above explains the parameter differences between West Indies and the Thirteen Colonies/United 
States.  Similar to the US-South case in section 6.2, it was in the colonial producers’ (absentee 
proprietors) interest to rely on African slavery as the dominant source of labor to maximize their 
land rents.  Through the population composition effect, this hindered technological progress in 
the West Indies, leading to its relative economic decline.  Note that one geographic factor that 
also contributed to the rapid rise of the United States income since the turn of the nineteenth 
century was its fast territorial expansion (section 5.1), expediting its technological progress 
through the production scale effect. 
To summarize, for Portuguese-type countries, their favorable soils and climates for sugar 
plantation brought them immediately blooming economies during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.  However sugar also turned them into slave-based economies, harming their growth 
capabilities.  Reversal of fortune eventually occurred. 
 
7.2 Spanish-type Resource-exploitation countries 
40 There were two events accentuating the decline of West Indies in the nineteenth century.  The 
first was the expansion of sugar beet production since the Continental Blockade by Napoleonic 
France, which had a depressing effect on cane sugar price.  The second was the abolition 
movements, making labor shortage an issue to colonial planters; some reduced the acreage of cane 
production in response (Galloway 1989, 123-125, 130-131, 145-147). 
41 Adam Smith (1994[1776], 633) stated that the Europeans “could not, it is supposed, support the 
labour of digging the ground under the burning sun of the West Indies”, so the culture of 
sugar-cane was carried on by negro slaves. 
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 Spain’s colonial interest lied in resource exploitation.  Being the first Europeans to arrive in 
America (West of the Papal Line), Spain decided to center its activities on Central America and 
Andean region, areas with dense native population and rich mineral deposits.  Mining, and to a 
lesser extent commercial agriculture, were the dominant economic activities in Spanish America 
(Newson 2006, 170-171).  An important feature of Spanish colonial rule was stringent European 
migration restrictions to the New World.42  The reasons for such restrictions were to keep defense 
costs down, as well as to maintain the privileged position of the elites who had made the move 
earlier (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997, 2000; 2012, ch.7).43  The restrictions made the White 
population contribute to only a small proportion of labor supply in Spanish colonies.  In the core 
areas of Spanish America (Mexico and Andes), where large numbers of native Indians were 
available, Spain could obtain sufficient forced domestic labor through encomienda and later 
repartimiento (Newson 1985, 1993).44  Encomienda was a labor system where Spanish settlers 
were granted the rights to extract labor or tribute from Indian populations.  In AD1549, 
encomienda was replaced by repartimiento, an essentially compulsory wage labor system for 
Indians, requiring indigenous communities to meet working quotas with wages set well below the 
free-market levels (Monteiro 2006, 199-200; Allen et al. 2012).  In the peripheral areas which 
were largely depopulated, Spain relied on African slaves to make up for the shortages of labor 
(Klein and Vinson III 2007, 20-21). 
 Similar to slavery, Spanish colonial labor market institutions (encomienda and repartimiento) 
placed Indian workers under exploitation.45  This discouraged them from learning and making 
improvements.46  In terms of our unified growth model, country A and country B are Spain and 
its American colony respectively.  Now we identify 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 as non-White population (Indians or 
Africans) size in the colony, 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 as slavery (non-White forced labor) import into the colony.47  
The Spanish migration restriction policy maintained a high proportion of non-White population in 
its colonial empire.  Proposition 5 states how the numbers of migrants and imported slaves 
(non-White forced labor) would be affected by strengthening migration restrictions, which is 
42 Landes (1998, 311) stated that, “the crown did its best to keep these [European] outsiders away 
from its possessions in the New World.”  Jacobs (1991, 68-69) made a comparison between 
wages in Castile/Andalusia and travel expenses to Tierra Firme in the AD1600s, and concluded 
that savings from wages alone would not be sufficient to finance emigration to the New World. 
43 Engerman and Sokoloff (2012, 218) stated that, “the Crown began early in the sixteenth century 
to regulate and restrict the flow of European migrants to its colonies in the Americas.  The 
stringency of the limits did vary somewhat over time, … but overall there is no doubt that Spanish 
policies limited, rather than encouraged, the migration of Europeans to the New World.” 
44 Even well into the turn of the nineteenth century, Spanish colonies (Mexico, Peru and Chile) 
were still characterized by high proportions of Indians, rather than Whites and Blacks (Table 1). 
45 In practice, encomienda and slavery differed in that the Spanish Crown imposed inheritance, 
trading and relocation restrictions on encomenderos (Yeager 1995).  Also, encomienda was by 
intention benevolent: the Spanish settlers who were granted encomienda were supposed to provide 
for protection, conversion and civilization of the aborigines (Bolton 1917). 
46 Newson (2006, 175) stated that, under encomienda and repartimiento, “there was no incentive 
for [the Indian workers] to preserve the labor force or develop its skills.” 
47 We take “non-White forced labor import” as Indian and African labor supply that Spain could 
obtain outside the natural increased amount within its colonial boundary.  Historically, Spain 
extended Indian labor supply through missionary work and enslavement (Newson 1985, 1993), 
and it imported African slaves through transatlantic slavery trade (Klein and Vinson III 2007, 
ch.2). 
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modeled as an exogenous reduction in 𝑚𝑚 in our model. 
Proposition 5 (Migration-restriction effect on migration and slavery trade): Ceteris 
paribus, given that the wage in country A is higher than the wage in country B, a tightening of 
migration restriction to move to country A reduces the number of migrants and raises the number 
of slaves (non-White forced labor) imported to country A, that is, 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
> 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
< 0, given 
𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴 > 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵. 
 Proof:  See Appendix 1. 
Tightening migration restrictions leads to more labor scarcity and raises marginal product of labor 
in the colony.  The colonial producer would raise slavery (non-White forced labor) import to 
maximize the land rent he or she could extract from the colony’s production activities. 
 We illustrate how the Spanish migration restriction policy maintained the low White 
population share, and led to relative economic decline in the Spanish colony.  Table 15 shows the 
parameter values for a “US-type country” and a “Spanish-type country” for illustration purpose.  
We set most of the parameter values for the two countries to be the same as those in Table 11.  
There are no land acquisition and slavery trade abolition, so that we can focus on the effect of 
Spanish migration restriction policy.  The only differences between the two countries lie in the 
parameter value 𝑚𝑚, initial White population share and initial technology level.  From Eltis (2000, 
9), during AD1700-AD1760, the numbers of Europeans migrating to the New World were 193,000 
for Spain and 372,000 for Britain respectively.  We simply set 𝑚𝑚 in “Spanish-type country” to 
be a fraction 193,000
372,000 of 𝑚𝑚 in “US-type country”.  We obtain 𝑚𝑚 in “Spanish-type country” as 
43,857.  We attribute the lower willingness to migrate to “Spanish-type country” to the migration 
restrictions in the Spanish colony.  We set the initial White population share in the “Spanish-type 
country” to Easterly and Levine (2015)’s Euro share estimate in AD1650 Mexico (5.26%).48  For 
initial per capita income, in AD1700 Mexico was 755
527
 times wealthier than the future United 
States (Table 8).  We calibrate 𝑧𝑧1𝐴𝐴 in “Spanish-type country” to 2.35 to match this fact. 
 INSERT TABLE 15 HERE 
Figure 10 depicts the simulated development paths for the “US-type country” (blue solid line) 
and the “Spanish-type country” (red dashed line) during AD1700-AD1860.  The migration 
restriction policy kept the White population share low in the “Spanish-type country” (panel (c)), 
cursing it with slow technological progress (panel (b)).  Eventually reversal of fortune occurred 
in around AD1760 (panel (a)). 
INSERT FIGURE 10 HERE 
 The GeoPopulation-Institution hypothesis offers a deep explanation for the relative decline 
of Spanish-type countries.  Geographically, the initially dense indigenous populations and 
48 Easterly and Levine (2015) provided Euro share estimates in AD1551 El Salvador, AD1572 
Guatemala, AD1650 Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and 
Venezuela, AD1700 Costa Rica, Cuba and Dominican Republic, AD1750 Puerto Rico, AD1778 
Panama and AD1786 Honduras.  Except Cuba, Dominican Republic, Panama and Puerto Rico, 
all Euro shares were less than 20% 
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precious metal mines in Central America and Andean region attracted Spanish conquest (Lockhart 
and Schwartz 1983, 84-85; Arroyo Abad et al. 2012).  In the conquered colonies, labor scarcity 
problem, aggravated by the Spanish migration restriction policy, had fostered the exploitation of 
native Indians and African slaves (Elliott 2006, 99) through encomienda and repartimiento, as well 
as African slavery.  Those were forced labor systems that discouraged the vast non-White 
population to contribute to economic progress, leading to the relative decline of Spanish-type 
countries in the centuries to come. 
 
7.3 United-States-type White-populated countries 
 For the United States and Canada, there were neither dense indigenous populations nor rich 
mineral deposits to exploit at the outset of the colonization era.  The soils and climates in general 
favored regimes of mixed farming that centered on grains and livestock, instead of sugar which 
required an enormous amount of plantation workers (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997, 2000; 2013, 
68).  Hence there was little incentive for the colonial producers (or European powers) to import 
African slaves (or impose coercive labor systems on domestic population).49  As a result, these 
countries possessed high proportions of European descendants (Table 1), who were free from 
forced labor institutions and conducive to technological progress and economic growth.  
Eventually, the United States and Canada turned into the richest American nations in the 
early-nineteenth century (Table 8). 
 
 
8 DISCUSSION 
 
8.1 Geography-Population-Institution 
The central theme of this paper is to argue that geography, population and institution are 
united components in orchestrating the rise and fall of nations in American landscapes during the 
colonization era.  Geographic factors (disease environment, soils and climates, resource 
abundance, territory expansion), population structure (White, Black and Indian labor) and labor 
market institutions (slavery institution, overseas slavery trade abolition, migration restriction, 
forced labor systems) are inseparable elements in explaining American economic history.50  Our 
unified growth model and GeoPopulation-Institution hypothesis reconcile (early-United States) 
development and (within-United States or across-nation) reversal of fortune that has occurred in 
the Western Hemisphere.  
In our theory, the population composition effect on technological progress provides the 
49 Elliott (2006, 103) stated that, when compared to the Providence Island, in New England “the 
combination of a good supply of immigrants with high survival and reproductive rates, the absence 
of a staple crop, and the widespread use of family labour, all reduced the necessity for importing 
slaves.” 
50  The view to take geography, population and institution simultaneously into account in 
explaining economic progress can be traced back at least to Adam Smith (1994[1776], 410): 
“Had human institutions, therefore, never disturbed the natural course of things, the 
progressive wealth and increase of the towns would, in every political society, be 
consequential, and in proportion to the improvement and cultivation of the territory or 
country.” 
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crucial link between geography and institution to account for the growth of American 
regions/countries.  Our theory does not claim that the Black people were by themselves burden 
for economic growth.  Indeed, the slavery institution that dissipated liberal returns to Blacks’ 
labor was the crux to this effect. 51  More generally, social stratification, either politically, 
economically, socially or culturally, can have implications on actual or perceived discrimination, 
affecting a country’s ability to engage in technological or organizational progress (Bénabou 2005), 
or even threatening national security (Gurr 1993). 52  Taking this into account in designing 
incentive systems to promote learning and propagation would be important for nations to realize 
their full growth potentials. 
 
8.2 The Great Divergence among American countries: AD1870-AD2008 
Our theory also has implications on the post-AD1860s Great Divergence among American 
countries.  One crucial component of our theory is legal asymmetry between the Whites and the 
Blacks during the colonization era.  The implication is that, after the abolition of slavery 
institution, the population composition effect on technological progress would fade away, and 
production scale effect and technology diffusion effect would then dominate.  This in turn implies 
that, holding population growth rate across American countries constant, once the country with the 
largest production scale becomes the richest country, it will perpetually retain its per capita income 
lead.53  Reversal of fortune will not occur thereafter.   
This prediction fits the growth experience among American countries since the 
late-nineteenth century, when most of them had abolished slavery institution.54  Figure 11 plots 
log per capita income in AD2008 against log per capita income in AD1870 among 13 American 
countries where we have data from Bolt and van Zanden (2013).55  In contrast to Figure 3, there 
was no trend of reversal of fortune – indeed, countries with higher per capita income in AD1870 in 
general continued to remain so in AD2008.  The early Great Divergence pattern among American 
countries emerged by AD1870 persists into today.  In other words, history dependence of 
economic prosperity (“Persistence of fortune”) has become a feature among American countries 
51 Williams (1964, 7) stated that, “[s]lavery was not born of racism: rather, racism was the 
consequence of slavery.”  
52 Societies being stratified by income, power, age, gender, race and ethnicity, and so on, is a 
never-ending issue.  Marx and Engels (1910[1848], 12) put, “[t]he history of all hitherto existing 
society is the history of class struggles.”  They reviewed how the capitalist class displaced the 
feudal aristocracy as the supreme class in the modern society, and predicted that the capitalist 
exploitation of workers would lead to social revolutions that overthrow the capitalist system itself. 
53 In reality, the fading of population composition effect might take a long time.  For example, in 
the United States, slavery institution was abolished in AD1865 (Thirteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution), but equal opportunities to race were legislated nearly a century later 
(The Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
54 Fogel and Engerman (1989, 33-34) provided a chronology of American slavery abolition: Haiti 
(1804), Argentina (1813[1853]), Colombia (1814[1851]), Chile (1823), Central America (1824), 
Mexico (1829), Bolivia (1831), British colonies (1838), Uruguay (1842), French and Danish 
colonies (1848), Ecuador (1851), Peru and Venezuela (1854), Dutch colonies (1863), the United 
States (1865), Puerto Rico (1873), Cuba (1886) and Brazil (1888). 
55 Our sample includes 13 countries, namely Argentina (AR), Brazil (BR), Canada (CA), Chile 
(CL), Colombia (CO), Cuba (CU), Ecuador (EC), Jamaica (JM), Mexico (MX), Peru (PE), the 
United States (US), Uruguay (UY) and Venezuela (VE). 
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since the late-nineteenth century.56 
INSERT FIGURE 11 HERE 
 
8.3 Three groups of American countries: Endogenous population versus 
Endogenous institution 
 When we analyze reversal of fortune among American countries (sections 3.2 and 7), we 
categorize the American countries into three groups - Spanish-type resource-exploitation countries, 
Portuguese-type sugar-exporting countries and United-States-type White-populated countries.  
Our categorization echoes the three groups of American countries highlighted by Engerman and 
Sokoloff (1997, 2000).  They stated that, due to the elite-tilting policies in Spanish-type countries 
and the high-use of slaves in Portuguese-type countries, high within-country inequalities in wealth, 
human capital and political power were generated.  This would then lead to institutions towards 
maintaining the inequalities, that have adverse impacts on the evolution of markets, commerce and 
technology.  Therefore these two groups of countries fell behind the United States and Canada in 
terms of economic growth since the eighteenth century. 
In their argument, the crucial link between factor endowments and differential economic 
development is within-country inequalities and endogenous institutions.  In comparison, in our 
theory, the critical linkage between geographic factors and divergent income growth paths lies in 
transatlantic labor movement and endogenous population structures.  The two theories are likely 
to be complementary in explaining reversal of fortune among American countries.  For example, 
a higher inequality within an American country might discourage European migration, and the 
colonial planters would turn to slavery import to resolve the labor scarcity problem.  This would 
accentuate the adverse population composition effect on technological progress, therefore 
accelerating the reversal of fortune among American countries during the colonization era. 
 
8.4 Resource blessing versus Resource Curse 
 In our model, whether resource was a blessing or a curse (section 2.1) for the American 
economies during the colonization era depends on whether resource boost would lead to a 
population structure that was conducive to growth.  For example, the Sugar Revolution in 
Barbados in the AD1640s opened up the prosperity of West Indies’ land in planting sugar.  
However, the rise of sugar did not just bring along funds and wealth, but also transatlantic slavery 
trade.  As shown in Figure 9, despite its initial higher land productivity, the buildup of African 
slaves led to West Indies’ long-term relative economic decline.  Besides Caribbean “sugar and 
slavery” (Sheridan 2000[1974]), Spanish-American mines and mita, another forced labor system 
that resembled repartimiento, presented a similar case of resource curse.  For example, the 
Potosí silver mines discovery in AD1545, together with the state-owned Huancavelica mines that 
deposited mercury necessary for silver refinement, motivated mita assignment.  Between 
AD1573 and AD1812, mita required Peru and Bolivia villages to provide labor quotas for the 
mining work in Potosí and Huancavelica.  Dell (2010) found that mita had long-run effects 
56 See Nunn (2014) for a survey of empirical studies concerning the impacts of historical events 
on current economic development. 
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of lowering household consumption and increasing children stunting in Peru and Bolivia. 
On the other hand, in section 5.1, the United States land acquisition illustrates resource 
blessing.  It happened that the United States enlarged its boarder over areas where native Indian 
population was thin and at a time when transatlantic slavery trade was abolished.  This allowed 
the United States to enjoy the production scale effect on technological progress without worsening 
its overall population conduciveness to growth, enabling it to surpass not just its American siblings, 
but also its motherland Britain eventually.  Note the distinction/complementarity between our 
theory with Acemoglu et al. (2002).  Acemoglu et al. (2002) stated that, Europeans were more 
likely to introduce extractive institutions in (American) colonies with larger initial population, 
bringing about their relative declines.  In ours, the emphasis is on population structure: it was the 
high proportion of population being affected by the forced labor system, that cursed the colonies 
with reversal of fortune.  If the extractive institutions affected only a small portion of the 
population (for example, the Indian Removal Act of 1830 in the United States), its effect on 
economic growth could be minimal. 
 
8.5 Eurasian UGT versus American UGT 
 Our theory addresses one issue that traditional unified growth theories fail to convey: the 
absolute decline of per capita income in American countries during the colonization era.  
Traditional unified growth theories (Galor and Weil 2000; Galor and Moav 2002) predict that over 
the course of economic development, an economy experiences first Malthusian income stagnation, 
and then Post-Malthusian and Modern Growth when per capita income keeps on rising.  However, 
we witness absolute per capita income declines in the Thirteen Colonies during AD1700-AD1774 
(Table 2), in Spanish-Mexico and in Caribbean countries during AD1700-AD1820 (Table 8).  Our 
model reconciles these absolute decline patterns (panel (a) in Figures 4, 9 and 10).  The 
underlying mechanism is that transatlantic migration and slavery trade added demographic 
pressure into the starting-thin American population.  In the eighteenth century when 
technological progress was slow, such demographic pressure exerted a significant and dominant 
population dilution effect on per capita income, leading to the absolute per capita income declines.  
Yet, for the sake of simplicity, we have treated variables like fertility, food prices as outside and 
constant factors in our model.  It would be interesting to consider how these variables are 
codetermined in unified growth models.57 
 More generally, we need two sets of unified growth theories to explain the world economic 
history, one for the Eastern Hemisphere (Eurasian UGT) and another for the Western Hemisphere 
(American UGT). 58  In the Eastern Hemisphere, during the long Malthusian era, domestic 
57 For example, Malthus (1826, 517) stated that the fast population growth in the United States at 
the time of his writing was the result of a combination of factors: 
“[O]n account of the extreme cheapness of good land, and a situation favourable to the 
exportation of grain, a capital could not be more advantageously employed than in 
agriculture; which, at the same time that it affords the greatest quantity of healthy work, 
supplies the most valuable produce to the society.  The consequence of these favourable 
circumstances united, was a rapidity of increase almost without parallel in history.” 
58 Ho (2016a, 2016b) posited Eurasian UGTs.  In comparison, this paper develops an American 
UGT. 
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population stockpiled and technology advanced due to the population scale effect on technological 
progress.  At some point in time technology growth was fast enough so that economies broke 
away from the Malthusian Trap of income stagnation, and entered the Post-Malthusian or Modern 
Growth era (Galor and Weil 2000).  This characterizes the historical experience of Eurasian 
countries, such as Britain and China.  However, in the Western Hemisphere, it was not the native 
Indians who built up large enough population stocks for ideas to spread and pulled the economies 
out of the Malthusian Trap.  They had been destroyed even before they had a chance to do so.  
Since the arrival of Christopher Columbus in AD1492, the Europeans brought along with them 
“guns, germs and steel” to conquer the New World at a dramatic rate.  At the time of the collapse 
of the Inca Empire in AD1533, the population density in America was about thirty-times thinner 
than that in Europe (Maddison 2003, 113), while the American technology level (in terms of wide 
adoption of iron tools) lagged the European counterpart by more than two millennia (Diamond 
1997, Table 18.1).  According to the European experience, both the population density and 
technology level in America were far from reaching the Post-Malthusian cutting edges.   
It was at this time that the Columbian Exchange of human population took place in the 
American landscapes, where the native American Indians were rapidly replaced by European 
Whites and African Blacks from the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, generating structural breaks 
on the original Malthusian population-technology evolution dynamics, and furnishing the New 
World with a new start.59  Therefore AD1492 would be a natural starting point for us to construct 
unified growth theories for the Western Hemisphere, when transatlantic labor movement and 
slavery institution soon followed.60  Due to data availability, our model simulations start with 
AD1700 but we believe our unified growth theory applies to America since Christopher Columbus 
and his crews spotted the New Land and set foot on the New World.61  By the late-nineteenth 
century, the Whites and the Blacks had built up large enough population and technology stocks in 
America, and the slavery institutions had been abolished.  Then the unified growth theories in the 
two Hemispheres converged to explain the development in individual nations and divergence in 
the world economy in the centuries to come. 
 
 
9 CONCLUSION 
 
59 Since Christopher Columbus’s arrival, in the next three centuries American countries in general 
experienced first Indian depopulations and then fast rates of Whites and Blacks reproduction.  
From Maddison (2008), the population in the future United States was two million in AD1500, and 
it dropped to one million in AD1700, and then it rebounded to about ten million in AD1820.  For 
Latin America, the figures were about eighteen million in AD1500, about nine million in AD1600 
and about twenty-two million in AD1820.  Diamond (1997, 354) labeled the capture of 
Atahuallpa, the last independent ruler in Inca Empire, as a symbol of the “collision of 
hemispheres”, when then the largest population replacement in recorded history began in 
America’s land. 
60 Borrowing Blaut (1992, 1)’s words: “the date 1492 represents the breakpoint between two 
fundamentally different evolutionary epochs.” 
61 See Christopher Columbus’s quote ahead of the Introduction.  Columbus brought the idea of 
taking advantage of the “brazilwood” and Indian “slaves” in West Indies during his third voyage in 
AD1498. 
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This paper develops a unified growth theory that argues for the importance of population in 
blending geography and institution, to account for development and divergence in American 
landscapes during the colonization era.  America witnessed continuous transatlantic migration 
and slavery import during the early Modern Period.  By the turn of the nineteenth century, 
American landscapes had been dominated by the descendants of European Whites and African 
Blacks.  To reconcile the American development process and the reversal of fortune, we construct 
a unified growth model with transatlantic migration and slavery trade, where the pace of 
technological progress depends on the White-Black population structure.  Slavery institution 
deprives Black slaves’ labor and wealth, removing their incentives to learn and make 
improvements.  Therefore, an American region/country with a greater Black population share 
would be less conducive to economic progress during the colonization era. 
 In sections 4-6, we apply the model to the Thirteen Colonies/United States.  Our simulation 
reconciles the fall and rise of per capita income in the Thirteen Colonies/United States during 
AD1700-AD1860.  We found that territorial acquisition is quantitatively important in explaining 
the rises in British migrants and United States’ per capita income growth rate during the 
early-nineteenth century.  For slavery trade abolition, besides its direct impact on banning slavery 
imports, the policy had little quantitative consequences on demographic-economic development in 
the United States.  Then our model reconciles the reversal of fortune between US-North and 
US-South in AD1800-AD1840 (Lindert and Williamson 2016).  From the calibration, the root 
causes of the relative fall of the US-South economy were its poorer demographic performance, 
lower Whites’ willingness to immigrate and smaller slavery trade cost parameter. 
 We put forward the GeoPopulation-Institution hypothesis to account for the above parameter 
differences.  The hypothesis can be split into three parts: (1) the geography channel: disease 
environment, soil and climate conditions, and land abundance affected the willingness of 
Europeans to settle and for colonial producers to import Black slaves in an American 
region/country; (2) the population channel: corresponding to the above willingness, domestic labor 
scarcity and political environment, transatlantic migration and slavery trade took place and shaped 
the demographic process; and (3) the institution channel: as a result of slavery institution, the 
change in White-Black population mix affected economic growth through the population 
composition effect on technological progress.  The GeoPopulation-Institution hypothesis predicts 
that, an American region/country with poor demographic performance would discourage European 
migration and promote African slavery import.  This would translate into the relative buildup of 
Black slavery population and curse the American region/country with a reversal of fortune.  Our 
hypothesis explains the relative decline of US-South. 
 In section 7, we apply the unified growth model and the GeoPopulation-Institution 
hypothesis to account for the reversal of fortune among three groups of American countries - 
Spanish-type resource-exploitation countries, Portuguese-type sugar-exporting countries and 
United-States-type White-populated countries (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997).  Spanish-type 
countries were characterized by initially dense Indian populations and rich mineral resources.  
Migration restrictions that kept the Europeans away from Spanish colonies were prevalent in 
keeping defense costs down and protecting the elites’ privileges.   Colonial producers responded 
to the labor scarcity problem by heavy exploitation of native Indians and slavery Africans through 
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forced labor systems.  Through an adverse population composition effect on technological 
progress, this cursed the Spanish-type countries with relative economic decline.  For the 
Portuguese-type countries, the local disease environment and intensive plantation tasks made 
Europeans averse to migrating to the sugar islands/countries.  With few political obstacles, 
colonial producers turned to importing African slaves, tilting the population there Black.  Under 
the slavery institution, the extremely high Black population share hindered technological progress 
in the sugar islands/countries, leading to their relative decline. 
Contrary to the above two cases, United-States-type countries (the United States and Canada) 
possessed neither dense populations and rich resources to be exploited, nor favorable soils and 
climates for sugar plantation at the outset of the colonization era.  There was little incentive for 
the colonial producers (or European powers) to import Black slaves (or introduce forced labor 
systems) into these countries, and so the populations there were dominated by the descendants of 
European Whites, who enjoyed economic freedom.  The extremely high White population shares 
provided these countries social capabilities conducive to economic progress, allowing them to 
eventually gain economic supremacy in the American continents by the early-nineteenth century.   
Our theory also implies that, after the abolition of slavery institution in America, the population 
composition effect on technological progress would fade away and a reversal of fortune would 
become less of a feature in American development.  This fits well into the reality that the most 
prosperous countries (the United States and Canada) by AD1870, the time when most American 
countries had abolished slavery, have been retaining their per capita income lead in America till 
today (Maddison 2008). 
 Our unified growth model provides a quantitative reconciliation of demographic-economic 
growth paths in the Western Hemisphere during the colonization era, and the 
GeoPopulation-Institution hypothesis provides a unified explanation for development and 
divergence in the New World economies.  To put our research one step further, the New World 
story is just one case that illustrates the importance of taking at least geography, population and 
institution simultaneously into account when thinking about economic development and 
divergence issues.  Geography, population and institution are inseparable components in 
understanding economic growth.  We do not live in a null space, a class-free society, or a power 
vacuum.  In response to inquiries on the wealth of nations, it is perhaps fruitful to direct our 
research focus on how demographic-economic variables interact with socio-political environment 
in time- and spatial-specific contexts.  The better we understand economic history, the better we 
are able to shape our future. 
 
 
Appendix 1: Proofs 
 
Proposition 1:  𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴 > 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 > 0 ; 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 < 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 > 0 
Proof: Use (2), (11), (13) to get 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚[𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 ∙ 𝛼𝛼(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼−1(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴)1−𝛼𝛼 − 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 ∙ 𝛼𝛼(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵)𝛼𝛼−1(𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵)1−𝛼𝛼], with 
(4), (5), (7) we obtain 
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(A.1)  𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚�𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 ∙ 𝛼𝛼 ��1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐻𝐻 + 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 + �1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐹𝐹 + 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡����� ��������������� ������
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴
�
𝛼𝛼−1 (𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴)1−𝛼𝛼 − 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 ∙
𝛼𝛼 ��1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐵𝐵����� ��
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
𝐵𝐵
�
𝛼𝛼−1 (𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵)1−𝛼𝛼� . 
Note (13) and (14) implies 
(A.2)  𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 = 2𝑓𝑓𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 . 
 
Taking total derivatives of (A.1) with respect to 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 to obtain 
(A.3)  𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴 = 𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴)1−𝛼𝛼 �(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼−1 + 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴(𝛼𝛼 − 1)(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼−2 �𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 + 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�� . 
Taking total derivatives of (A.2) with respect to 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴, and make use of 
𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴 = 𝑚𝑚 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴  (from (2)) to 
obtain 
(A.4)  𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴 = � 12𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕� 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 . 
Combine (A.3) and (A.4) to get 
(A.5)  𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴 = 𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝛼𝛼−1�𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴�1−𝛼𝛼
1−𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼−1)𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝛼𝛼−2�𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴�1−𝛼𝛼�1+ 12𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓� > 0 . 
By (A.4) 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴 > 0 too. 
 
Taking total derivatives of (A.1) with respect to 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 to obtain 
(A.6)  𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡
𝐵𝐵 = 𝑚𝑚 �𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼 − 1)𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼−2(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴)1−𝛼𝛼 �𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 + 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵� − 𝛼𝛼(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵)𝛼𝛼−1(𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵)1−𝛼𝛼� . 
Use (3), (4), (5) to rewrite (13) as 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 = 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 ∙ 𝛼𝛼��1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐻𝐻 + 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 + �1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐹𝐹 +
𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡�
𝛼𝛼−1(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴)1−𝛼𝛼.  Taking total derivatives of this expression and (A.2) with respect to 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵, we get 
(A.7)  𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡
𝐵𝐵 = 12𝜕𝜕 �𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼 − 1)𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼−2(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴)1−𝛼𝛼 �𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 + 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵��    or  
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡
𝐵𝐵 = 12𝑓𝑓𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼−1)𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝛼𝛼−2�𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴�1−𝛼𝛼
1−
1
2𝑓𝑓
𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼−1)𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝛼𝛼−2�𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴�1−𝛼𝛼 ∙ 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 . 
Plug (A.7) into (A.6), rearranging to get 
(A.8)  𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡
𝐵𝐵 = −𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵�𝛼𝛼−1�𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵�1−𝛼𝛼
1−𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼−1)𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝛼𝛼−2�𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴�1−𝛼𝛼� 1
1−
1
2𝑓𝑓𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼−1)𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝛼𝛼−2�𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴�1−𝛼𝛼�
< 0 . 
By (A.7) 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡
𝐵𝐵 > 0. 
 
 
Proposition 2: 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1
𝐻𝐻 < 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐻𝐻 < 0 ; 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐹𝐹 < 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐹𝐹 <
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0; 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1
𝐵𝐵 > 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐵𝐵 < 0 
Proof: Taking total derivatives of (A.1) with respect to �1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐻𝐻 , which reflects the White 
population originating from natural increase at time 𝑡𝑡,  to obtain 
(A.9)  𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1
𝐻𝐻 = 𝑚𝑚𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼 − 1)(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼−2(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴)1−𝛼𝛼 �1 + 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐻𝐻 + 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐻𝐻 � . 
Taking total derivatives of (A.2) with respect to �1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐻𝐻  to obtain 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐻𝐻 =
�
1
2𝜕𝜕
�
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1
𝐻𝐻 .  Note from (2) that 
𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1
𝐻𝐻 = 𝑚𝑚 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐻𝐻 , which implies 
(A.10) 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1
𝐻𝐻 = � 12𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕� 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐻𝐻  . 
Combine (A.9) and (A.10) to get 
(A.11) 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1
𝐻𝐻 = 𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼−1)𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝛼𝛼−2�𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴�1−𝛼𝛼1−𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼−1)𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝛼𝛼−2�𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴�1−𝛼𝛼�1+ 12𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓� < 0 . 
By (A.10) 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1
𝐻𝐻 < 0 too. 
 
Taking total derivatives of (A.1) with respect to �1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐹𝐹 , which reflects the Black 
population originating from natural increase at time 𝑡𝑡,  to obtain 
(A.12)  𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1
𝐹𝐹 = 𝑚𝑚𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼 − 1)(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼−2(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴)1−𝛼𝛼 �1 + 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐹𝐹 +
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1
𝐹𝐹 � . 
Taking total derivatives of (A.2) with respect to �1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐹𝐹  to obtain 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐹𝐹 =
�
1
2𝜕𝜕
�
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1
𝐹𝐹 .  Note from (2) that 
𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1
𝐹𝐹 = 𝑚𝑚 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐹𝐹 , which implies 
(A.13)  𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1
𝐹𝐹 = � 12𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕� 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐹𝐹  . 
Combine (A.12) and (A.13) to get 
(A.14) 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1
𝐹𝐹 = 𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼−1)𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝛼𝛼−2�𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴�1−𝛼𝛼1−𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼−1)𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝛼𝛼−2�𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴�1−𝛼𝛼�1+ 12𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓� < 0 . 
By (A.13) 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1
𝐹𝐹 < 0 too. 
 
Taking total derivatives of (A.1) with respect to �1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐵𝐵 , which reflects country B’s 
population originating from natural increase at time 𝑡𝑡,  yields 
(A.15)  𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1
𝐵𝐵 = −𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼 − 1)𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵)𝛼𝛼−2(𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵)1−𝛼𝛼 > 0 . 
Taking total derivatives of (A.2) with respect to �1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐵𝐵  to get 
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(A.16)  𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1
𝐵𝐵 = � 12𝜕𝜕� 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐵𝐵  . 
Use (3), (4), (5) to rewrite (13) as 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 = 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 ∙ 𝛼𝛼��1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐻𝐻 + 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 + �1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐹𝐹 +
𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡�
𝛼𝛼−1(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴)1−𝛼𝛼.  Taking total derivatives with respect to �1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐵𝐵  and plug it into (A.16) 
to obtain 
(A.17) 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1
𝐵𝐵 = 12𝑓𝑓𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼−1)𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝛼𝛼−2�𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴�1−𝛼𝛼 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕�1+𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐵𝐵1− 1
2𝑓𝑓
𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼−1)𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝛼𝛼−2�𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴�1−𝛼𝛼 < 0, where we have use (A.15). 
 
 
Proposition 3: 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴
> 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴
> 0 
Proof: Taking total derivatives of (A.1) with respect to 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 to get 
(A.18) 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴
= 𝑚𝑚�𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼−1(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴)−𝛼𝛼 + 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼 − 1)(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼−2(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴)1−𝛼𝛼 �𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 + 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴�� . 
Taking total derivatives of (A.2) with respect to 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴, together with 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴
= 𝑚𝑚 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴
 (from (2)) to get 
(A.19) 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴
= � 1
2𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
�
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴
 . 
Combine (A.18) and (A.19) to obtain 
(A.20) 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴
= 𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼(1−𝛼𝛼)�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝛼𝛼−1�𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴�−𝛼𝛼
1−𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼−1)�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝛼𝛼−2�𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴�1−𝛼𝛼�1+ 12𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓� > 0 . 
By (A.19) 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴
> 0 too. 
 
 
Proposition 4: 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
> 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
< 0 
Proof: Taking total derivatives of (A.1) with respect to 𝑓𝑓 to obtain 
(A.21) 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 𝑚𝑚𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼 − 1)(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼−1(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴)1−𝛼𝛼 �𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 + 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 � . 
Taking total derivatives of (A.2) with respect to 𝑓𝑓 to get 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 2𝑓𝑓 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
+ 2𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 .  Note from (2) 
that 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 𝑚𝑚 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
, which implies 
(A.22) 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= − 1
𝜕𝜕
𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 + � 12𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕� 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕  . 
Combine (A.21) and (A.22) to get 
(A.23) 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= −𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼−1)𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝛼𝛼−2�𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴�1−𝛼𝛼�1𝑓𝑓𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡�
1−𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼−1)𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝛼𝛼−2�𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴�1−𝛼𝛼�1+ 12𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓� > 0 . 
Plug (A.23) into (A.22) to get 
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(A.24) 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= − 1
𝜕𝜕
𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 �
1−𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼−1)𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝛼𝛼−2�𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴�1−𝛼𝛼
1−𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼−1)𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝛼𝛼−2�𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴�1−𝛼𝛼�1+ 12𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓�� < 0 . 
 
 
Proposition 5: 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
> 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
< 0, given 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 > 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 
Proof: Taking total derivatives of (A.1) with respect to 𝑚𝑚 to obtain 
(A.25) 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= (𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 − 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵) + 𝑚𝑚𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼 − 1)(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)𝛼𝛼−2(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴)1−𝛼𝛼 �𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 + 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕� . 
Taking total derivatives of (A.2) with respect to 𝑚𝑚 to get 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= � 1
2𝜕𝜕
�
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
.  Note from (2) that 
𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= (𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 − 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵) + 𝑚𝑚 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 .  Combine the two expressions to eliminate 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕  and get 
(A.26) 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= − 1
2𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
(𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 − 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵) + � 12𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕� 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕  . 
Combine (A.25) and (A.26) to get 
(A.27) 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= �𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴−𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵��1−𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼−1)𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝛼𝛼−2�𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴�1−𝛼𝛼� 12𝑓𝑓��
1−𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼−1)𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝛼𝛼−2�𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴�1−𝛼𝛼�1+ 12𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓�   > 0  𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 > 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵< 0  𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡h𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐  . 
Plug (A.27) into (A.26) to get 
(A.28) 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 1
2𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
(𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 − 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵) � 𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼−1)𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝛼𝛼−2�𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴�1−𝛼𝛼
1−𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼−1)𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝛼𝛼−2�𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴�1−𝛼𝛼�1+ 12𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓��< 0  𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 > 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵> 0  𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡h𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐  . 
 
 
Appendix 2: Adjustment mechanisms 
Figure A.1 illustrates the mechanism behind proposition 1(i).  It depicts the labor market 
equilibrium across two consecutive time periods (𝑡𝑡 = 1 and 𝑡𝑡 = 2) when technological progress 
occurs in country A.  For simplicity, suppose there is neither technological progress in country B 
nor natural population growth (𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 = 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 = 0).  In the left panel, the upward sloping line 
represents the Harris-Todaro migration curve (2), while the downward sloping line 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿1𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿1𝐹𝐹) 
depicts the marginal product of Whites at time 1 (right hand side of (13)).  In the right panel, the 
upward sloping line shows the marginal slavery trade cost curve, while the downward sloping line 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿1
𝐹𝐹(𝐿𝐿1𝐻𝐻) depicts the marginal product of Blacks at time 1 (equation (14)).62  The original 
equilibrium is at 𝐸𝐸1. 
 INSERT FIGURE A.1 HERE 
As the economy progresses from time 1 to time 2, technological progress in country A 
moves up the marginal product curves for the Whites and for the Blacks to 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿2𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿1𝐹𝐹) and 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿2
𝐹𝐹(𝐿𝐿1𝐻𝐻) respectively.  In the left panel, the new marginal product curve intersects the H-T 
62 We state the equations for the four curves in Figure A.1 as follows: 
H-T migration curve: 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 = 1𝜕𝜕 �𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻 − �1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐻𝐻 + 𝑚𝑚𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵� 
 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻: 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 = 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 ∙ 𝛼𝛼(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹)𝛼𝛼−1(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴)1−𝛼𝛼 
Marginal slavery trade cost curve: marginal cost = 2𝑓𝑓�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹 − �1 + 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1𝐹𝐹 �  
 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹 : marginal product of the Blacks = 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 ∙ 𝛼𝛼(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹)𝛼𝛼−1(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴)1−𝛼𝛼 
42 
 
                                                      
migration curve at point 𝐸𝐸′ where 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻′ .  The higher colony wage draws migrants into 
country A, raising total population in country A, and depressing the marginal product curve for the 
Blacks in the right panel to 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿2𝐹𝐹(𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻′).  However, in general 𝐸𝐸′ is still not the new equilibrium.  
Without new slavery imports, the marginal product of Blacks is higher than the marginal cost of 
importing slaves at 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 = 𝐿𝐿1𝐹𝐹 in the right panel.  The colonial producer will import slaves until 
the new marginal product curve for the Blacks 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿2𝐹𝐹(𝐿𝐿2𝐻𝐻) intersects the marginal slavery trade 
cost curve at 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 = 𝐿𝐿2𝐹𝐹  in the right panel, where 𝐿𝐿2𝐻𝐻  corresponds to the equilibrium White 
population such that the H-T migration curve intersects the new marginal product curve for the 
Whites 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿2𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿2𝐹𝐹) in the left panel.  Point 𝐸𝐸2 is the new equilibrium, with European migrants 
inflow 𝑀𝑀2 = 𝐿𝐿2𝐻𝐻 − 𝐿𝐿1𝐻𝐻 and African slaves import 𝑄𝑄2 = 𝐿𝐿2𝐹𝐹 − 𝐿𝐿1𝐹𝐹. 
 To generalize the results of the above exercise, technological progress and natural population 
growth affect transatlantic migration and slavery trade through interactions between diminishing 
marginal productivities of Whites and Blacks, potential migrants’ response to home-colony wage 
differential and colonial producer’s rent maximizing behavior.63 
 
 
Appendix 3: Calibration for simulating reversal of fortune between US-North 
and US-South 
 Similar to section 4.3, we calibrate the parameters to match historical land areas, population, 
income levels and growth, migrations and slavery imports in the three regions/countries.  Due to 
data limitation, in most cases we calibrate parameters using AD1700-AD1770 data, and assume 
they remained constant up till AD1860.  The main calibration results are: 
 Land area: Using the states areas being identified as US-North and US-South (U.S. Bureau 
of the Census 2012, Table 18), the initial land areas covered by the two regions in AD1700 are 424,397𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚2 and 480,157𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚2 respectively. 
Initial population and output: Using AD1700 values from Tables 4 and 6, we take the initial 
White populations in US-North and US-South to be 141,000 and 99,000 respectively, and the 
initial Black populations in the two regions to be 6,000 and 16,000 respectively.  We keep 
AD1700 British population 𝐿𝐿1𝐵𝐵 = 10,490,000.  From Table 2, we take the initial per capita 
income in US-North as the AD1700 simple average of those in New England and Middle Colonies 
(𝑦𝑦1𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁 = 1.76+2.62 = 2.18), and initial per capita income in US-South as the AD1700 simple average 
of those in Upper South and Lower South (𝑦𝑦1𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 = 5.11+6.772 = 5.94).  Using (9) and (17), the 
initial technology levels in the two regions are 𝑧𝑧1𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁 = 1.15 and 𝑧𝑧1𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 = 2.52 respectively. 
Migration and slavery import: Applying (2) to average decennial migration to US-North 
63 We can do similar exercises to study the effects of technology growth in country B (causing 
initial upward shift in H-T migration curve), White natural population growth in country A 
(causing initial downward shift in H-T migration curve), Black natural population growth in 
country A (causing initial downward shift in marginal slavery trade cost curve) and natural 
population growth in country B (causing initial downward shift in H-T migration curve) on 
equilibrium transatlantic migration and slavery trade. 
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and US-South during AD1700-AD1770 (Table 5) and the implied AD1700 wages, we get 
𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁 = 369,048 and 𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆 = 18,870.  Similarly, applying (13)-(14) to average decennial Blacks 
imported to US-North and US-South during AD1700-AD1770 (Table 7) and the implied AD1700 
wages, we obtain 𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁 = 0.000436 and 𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆 = 0.0000402. 
Population and income growth: Assuming constant natural population growth rates in the 
three regions/countries, applying population accumulation equations to AD1700-AD1770 data in 
Tables 4-7, we obtain 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0.29  and 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻 = 0.24  in US-North, 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0.15  and 
𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿
𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻 = 0.21  in US-South.  We keep 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 = 0.086  in Britain.  We calibrate the 
learning-by-doing parameters and technology diffusion parameters as 𝜇𝜇1 = 1.4 × 10−8 , 
𝜇𝜇2 = 1.2 × 10−15 and 𝑑𝑑 = 0.02 to match per capita income growth trends in Britain and in the 
United States during AD1700-AD1840. 
Land acquisition and slavery trade abolition: Similar to sections 5.1 and 5.2, for United 
States land acquisition, we assume the land areas of both US-North and US-South to be raised by 
factors of 864,746
349,250, 1,681,828864,746  and 2,940,0421,681,828 in AD1790, AD1810 and AD1850 respectively.  For 
slavery trade abolition, we raise 𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁  and 𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆  to prohibitively-high levels 𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁 = 𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆 = 1 from 
AD1810 onwards. 
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 TABLE 1 
Population composition in selected American regions/countries 
     
Economy Year White (%) Black (%) Indian (%) 
1.   Barbados 1690 25 75 - 
2.   Barbados 1801 19.3 80.7 - 
3.   Mexico 1793 18 10 72 
4.   Peru 1795 12.6 7.3 80.1 
5.   Venezuela 1800-09 25 62 13 
6.   Cuba 1792 49 51 - 
7.   Brazil 1798 31.1 61.2 7.8 
8.   Chile 1790 8.3 6.7 85 
9.   U.S.-Nation 1860 84.9 14 1.1 
10.  U.S. South 1860 61.7 37.7 0.7 
11.  U.S. North 1860 96.2 2.6 1.3 
12.  Canada 1881 97 0.5 2.5 
13.  Argentina 1918 95.6 1.2 3.2 
 
Source: Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) Table 10.4. 
 
------------------------------------------------- 
TABLE 2 
Real per capita income of the Thirteen Colonies, AD1650-AD1774 
         
  
1650 1675 1700 1725 1750 1770 1774 
US-North 
New England 1.13 1.45 1.76 1.88 1.84 2.11 1.93 
Middle Colonies 
  
2.6 2.52 2.6 2.6 2.72 
US-South 
Upper South 
 
5.98 5.11 4.22 3.94 3.9 3.8 
Lower South 
  
6.77 6.42 5.87 5.11 5.54 
All 13 colonies 
  
3.45 3.21 3.21 3.27 3.29 
Britain 
 
1.22 1.52 2.06 2.03 2.09 2.12 1.96 
 
Source: Lindert and Williamson (2016) Table 6, per capita income in bare-bones welfare ratios.  
Note that in Lindert and Williamson (2016)’s original article, New England includes NH, MA, RI 
and CT; Middle Colonies includes NY, NJ and PA; Upper South includes VA, MD and DE; Lower 
South includes GA, NC and SC. 
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TABLE 3 
Per annum real per capita income growth rate 
of the Thirteen States, AD1774-AD1840 
    
  
1774-1800 (%) 1800-1840 (%) 
US-North 
New England -0.33 2.44 
Middle Colonies -0.27 1.77 
US-South 
 
-1.35 0.69 
All three U.S. regions 
 
-0.86 1.56 
    
Source: Lindert and Williamson (2013) Table 6.  Note that in Lindert and Williamson (2013)’s 
original article, New England includes CT, MA, ME, NH, RI and VT; Middle Colonies (Middle 
Atlantic) includes NY, NJ, PA, DE, MD and DC; US-South (South Atlantic) includes VA, GA, NC 
and SC. 
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TABLE 4 
White population of British America, in thousands, 
by region, AD1620-AD1770 
    
Year US-North US-South West Indies 
1620 
 
1 (NA) 
 
1630 2 (NA) 2 (NA) 2 (NA) 
1640 16 (NA) 8 (NA) 14 (NA) 
1650 27 (96%) 12 (100%) 44 (75%) 
1660 38 (95%) 25 (96%) 47 (58%) 
1670 59 (98%) 43 (93%) 44 (46%) 
1680 81 (96%) 62 (94%) 42 (36%) 
1690 118 (97%) 78 (90%) 37 (27%) 
1700 141 (96%) 99 (86%) 33 (22%) 
1710 176 (95%) 120 (81%) 30 (17%) 
1720 259 (95%) 153 (77%) 35 (17%) 
1730 346 (95%) 205 (72%) 37 (14%) 
1740 485 (95%) 271 (67%) 34 (12%) 
1750 625 (95%) 309 (59%) 35 (11%) 
1760 836 (95%) 432 (60%) 41 (10%) 
1770 1087 (96%) 587 (59%) 45 (9%) 
 
 
Source: Galenson (1996) Table 4.2.  Parentheses indicating percentage of Whites in population.  
US-North refers to New England and Middle Colonies, while US-South refers to Upper South and 
Lower South.  New England contains Maine (ME), New Hampshire (NH), Vermont (VT), 
Plymouth, Massachusetts (MA), Rhode Island (RI) and Connecticut (CT). Middle Colonies 
contains New York (NY), New Jersey (NJ), Pennsylvania (PA), and Delaware (DE).  Upper 
South contains Maryland (MD) and Virginia (VA). Lower South contains Georgia (GA), North 
Carolina (NC), and South Carolina (SC).  West Indies contains Barbados, Jamaica, Antigua, 
Montserrat, Nevis, and St. Kitts. 
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TALBE 5 
Decennial net migration of Whites from British Isles to 
British America, in thousands, by region, AD1630-AD1770 
    Decade 
Beginning 
US-North US-South West Indies 
1630 11 11 41 
1640 5 14 40 
1650 3 18 33 
1660 8 20 12 
1670 5 18 15 
1680 12 13 11 
1690 -10 3 19 
1700 -4 25 10 
1710 30 22 18 
1720 13 48 16 
1730 36 46 6 
1740 3 -1 9 
1750 31 33 11 
1760 15 32 5 
1770 -11 26 11 
Total 147 328 257 
 
Source: Galenson (1996) Table 4.5.  See Table 4 for definitions of US-North, US-South and West 
Indies. 
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TABLE 6 
Black population of British America, in thousands, 
by region, AD1650-AD1770 
    Year US-North US-South West Indies 
1650 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 15 (25%) 
1660 2 (5%) 1 (4%) 34 (42%) 
1670 1 (2%) 3 (7%) 52 (54%) 
1680 3 (4%) 4 (6%) 76 (64%) 
1690 4 (3%) 9 (10%) 98 (73%) 
1700 6 (4%) 16 (14%) 115 (78%) 
1710 9 (5%) 29 (19%) 148 (83%) 
1720 15 (5%) 46 (23%) 176 (83%) 
1730 18 (5%) 79 (28%) 221 (86%) 
1740 26 (5%) 134 (33%) 250 (88%) 
1750 32 (5%) 211 (41%) 295 (89%) 
1760 42 (5%) 285 (40%) 365 (90%) 
1770 50 (4%) 406 (41%) 434 (91%) 
 
Source: Galenson (1996) Table 4.3.  Parentheses indicating percentage of Blacks in population.    
See Table 4 for definitions of US-North, US-South and West Indies. 
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TABLE 7 
Decennial net flow of Blacks to British America 
in thousands, by region, AD1650-AD1770 
    Decade 
Beginning 
US-North US-South West Indies 
1650 0 1 39 
1660 0 2 38 
1670 0 2 53 
1680 0 8 59 
1690 0 9 95 
1700 1 13 88 
1710 4 17 93 
1720 2 17 126 
1730 2 40 88 
1740 0 59 115 
1750 1 21 127 
1760 -3 40 86 
1770 -7 -10 81 
Total 0 219 1088 
 
Source: Galenson (1996) Table 4.6.  See Table 4 for definitions of US-North, US-South and West 
Indies. 
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 TABLE 8 
Per capita GDP (in AD1990 international dollars)  
of the 3 types of American countries, AD1500-AD2000 
         
  
1500 1600 1700 1820 1870 1900 2000 
Spanish-type 
resource-exploitation countries 
Mexico 550 755 755 566 642 1,435 - 
Other Spanish America 
(excluding the Caribbean) 
410 431 502 663 683 - 5,508 
Portuguese-type sugar-exporting 
countries 
Brazil 400 428 459 646 713 678 5,556 
Caribbean countries 400 430 650 636 549 880 5,634 
United-States-type 
White-populated countries 
United States 400 400 527 1,231 2,445 4,091 28,129 
Canada 400 400 430 904 1,695 2,911 22,488 
 
Source: Coatsworth (2005) Table 1, Maddison (2008) for Canada data. 
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TABLE 9 
Benchmark parameters, the Thirteen Colonies, AD1700-AD1780 
 
  
Symbol Interpretation Value 
Parameters  
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 Land area in Thirteen Colonies 904,554 
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 Land area in Britain 310,813 
𝑚𝑚 Willingness to migrate 84,532 
𝑓𝑓 Slavery trade cost parameter 0.0000226 
𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿
𝐻𝐻 White natural population growth rate in Thirteen Colonies 0.23 
𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿
𝐹𝐹  Black natural population growth rate in Thirteen Colonies 0.22 
𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿
𝐵𝐵  Natural population growth rate in Britain 0.086 
𝜇𝜇 Learning-by-doing parameter 3.9 × 10−8 
𝑑𝑑 Technology diffusion parameter 0.03 
𝛼𝛼 Production function parameter 0.4 
Initial conditions in AD1700  
𝐿𝐿1
𝐻𝐻 Initial White population in Thirteen Colonies 240,000 
𝐿𝐿1
𝐹𝐹 Initial Black population in Thirteen Colonies 22,000 
𝐿𝐿1
𝐵𝐵 Initial population in Britain 10,490,000 
𝑧𝑧1
𝐴𝐴 Initial technology level in Thirteen Colonies 1.64 
𝑧𝑧1
𝐵𝐵 Initial technology level in Britain 17.0 
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 TABLE 10 
Total land area of the United States, AD1776-AD1860 
    
 
Year Total land area (square miles) 
 
 
1776 349,250 
 
 
1790 864,746 
 
 
1800 864,746 
 
 
1810 1,681,828 
 
 
1820 1,749,462 
 
 
1830 1,749,462 
 
 
1840 1,749,462 
 
 
1850 2,940,042 
 
 
1860 2,969,640 
 
 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), Historical statistics of the United States, colonial times 
to 1970, Series J 1-2.  The AD1776 land area is based on the total land area of the original 
Thirteen Colonies calculated in section 4.3, converted to square miles.  
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TABLE 11 
Calibrated parameters, the Thirteen Colonies/United States with land acquisition, 
AD1700-AD1860 
 
------------------------------------------------- 
 
TABLE 12 
Calibrated parameters, the Thirteen Colonies/United States with land acquisition and 
slavery trade abolition, AD1700-AD1860 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Symbol Interpretation Value 
Parameters  
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 Land area in the United States 904,554 for AD1700-AD1789 904,554 × 864,746
349,250 for AD1790-AD1809 
904,554 × 1,681,828
349,250  for AD1810-AD1849 
904,554 × 2,940,042
349,250  for AD1850-AD1860 
𝜇𝜇1 Learning-by-doing parameter 1.4 × 10−8 
𝜇𝜇2 Learning-by-doing parameter 1.2 × 10−15 
𝑑𝑑 Technology diffusion parameter 0.009 
  
   𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵, 𝑚𝑚, 𝑓𝑓, 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹, 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵, 𝛼𝛼 Same as Table 9 
  
Initial conditions in AD1700  
   𝐿𝐿1𝐻𝐻, 𝐿𝐿1𝐹𝐹 ,  𝐿𝐿1𝐵𝐵, 𝑧𝑧1𝐴𝐴, 𝑧𝑧1𝐵𝐵 Same as Table 9 
Symbol Interpretation Value 
Parameters  
𝑓𝑓 Slavery trade cost parameter 0.0000226 for AD1700-AD1809 1 for AD1810-AD1860 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴, 𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵, 𝑚𝑚, 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 , 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 , 𝜇𝜇1, 𝜇𝜇2, 𝑑𝑑, 𝛼𝛼 Same as Table 11 
Initial conditions in AD1700  
   𝐿𝐿1𝐻𝐻, 𝐿𝐿1𝐹𝐹 ,  𝐿𝐿1𝐵𝐵, 𝑧𝑧1𝐴𝐴, 𝑧𝑧1𝐵𝐵 Same as Table 11 
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TABLE 13 
Calibrated parameters, reversal of fortune between US-North and US-South, 
AD1700-AD1860 
 
 
 
Symbol Interpretation Value 
US-North (N) US-South (S) 
Parameters   
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 Land area in American region 424,397 for AD1700-AD1789 424,397 × 864,746
349,250 for AD1790-AD1809 
424,397 × 1,681,828
349,250  for AD1810-AD1849 
424,397 × 2,940,042
349,250  for AD1850-AD1860 
480,157 for AD1700-AD1789 480,157 × 864,746
349,250 for AD1790-AD1809 
480,157 × 1,681,828
349,250  for AD1810-AD1849 
480,157 × 2,940,042
349,250  for AD1850-AD1860 
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 Land area in Britain 310,813 310,813 
𝑚𝑚 Willingness to migrate  369,048 18,870 
𝑓𝑓 Slavery trade cost parameter 0.000436 for AD1700-AD1809 1 for AD1810-AD1860 0.0000402 for AD1700-AD1809 1 for AD1810-AD1860 
𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿
𝐻𝐻  White natural population growth 
rate in American region 
0.29 0.15 
𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿
𝐹𝐹 Black natural population growth 
rate in American region 
0.24 0.21 
𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿
𝐵𝐵 Natural population growth rate 
in Britain 
0.086 0.086 
𝜇𝜇1 Learning-by-doing parameter 1.4 × 10−8 1.4 × 10−8 
𝜇𝜇2 Learning-by-doing parameter 1.2 × 10−15 1.2 × 10−15 
𝑑𝑑 Technology diffusion parameter 0.02 0.02 
𝛼𝛼 Production function parameter 0.4 0.4 
Initial conditions in AD1700   
𝐿𝐿1
𝐻𝐻 Initial White population in 
American region 
141,000 99,000 
𝐿𝐿1
𝐹𝐹 Initial Black population in 
American region 
6,000 16,000 
𝐿𝐿1
𝐵𝐵 Initial population in Britain 10,490,000 10,490,000 
𝑧𝑧1
𝐴𝐴 Initial technology level in 
American region 
1.15 2.52 
𝑧𝑧1
𝐵𝐵 Initial technology level in 
Britain 
17.0 17.0 
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TABLE 14 
Calibrated parameters, the Thirteen Colonies/United States and West Indies, 
AD1700-AD1860 
 
 
  
Symbol Interpretation Value 
Thirteen Colonies/United States West Indies 
Parameters   
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 Land area in American country 904,554 for AD1700-AD1789 904,554 × 864,746
349,250 for AD1790-AD1809 904,554 × 1,681,828
349,250  for AD1810-AD1849 904,554 × 2,940,042
349,250  for AD1850-AD1860 
11,904 
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 Land area in Britain 310,813 310,813 
𝑚𝑚 Willingness to migrate  84,532 35,096 
𝑓𝑓 Slavery trade cost parameter 0.0000226 for AD1700-AD1809 1 for AD1810-AD1860 0.00000781 for AD1700-AD1809 1 for AD1810-AD1860 
𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿
𝐻𝐻  White natural population growth rate in 
American country 
0.23 -0.20 
𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿
𝐹𝐹 Black natural population growth rate in 
American country 
0.22 -0.20 
𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿
𝐵𝐵 Natural population growth rate in Britain 0.086 0.086 
𝜇𝜇1 Learning-by-doing parameter 1.4 × 10−8 1.4 × 10−8 
𝜇𝜇2 Learning-by-doing parameter 1.2 × 10−15 1.2 × 10−15 
𝑑𝑑 Technology diffusion parameter 0.009 0.009 
𝛼𝛼 Production function parameter 0.4 0.4 
Initial conditions in AD1700   
𝐿𝐿1
𝐻𝐻 Initial White population in American country 240,000 33,000 
𝐿𝐿1
𝐹𝐹 Initial Black population in American country 22,000 115,000 
𝐿𝐿1
𝐵𝐵 Initial population in Britain 10,490,000 10,490,000 
𝑧𝑧1
𝐴𝐴 Initial technology level in American country 1.64 19.3 
𝑧𝑧1
𝐵𝐵 Initial technology level in Britain 17.0 17.0 
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TABLE 15 
Parameters, “US-type country” and “Spanish-type country”, AD1700-AD1860 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------------- 
TABLE A.1 
Estimates of life expectancy at age 30 in selected counties, 
the Thirteen Colonies/United States, the eighteenth century 
       
Place and time     Life expectancy at 30   
       US-North 
      
  Hingham, Mass., 1721-1800 
  
38.4/38.6 
  
  Salem, Mass., 18th c. 
  
30.3 
  
  Andover, Mass., 1730-1759 
  
36.3 
  
  East Haven, Conn., 1773-1822 
  
36.4 
  
  Philadelphia gentry, 1700-1800 
  
31.2/33.7 
  
       US-South 
      
  Maryland legislators, Native 1700-1767 
 
27 
  
                    Immigrant 1700-1758 
 
26.6 
  
  Middlesex County, Vir., 1650-1710 
 
19.4 
  
  Perquimans County, NC., 18th c. 
 
23.1 
  
             
       Source: Wells (1992) Table 3. 
     
 
 
 
Symbol Interpretation Value 
“US-type country” “Spanish-type country” 
Parameters   
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 Land area in American country 904,554 904,554 
𝑚𝑚 Willingness to migrate  84,532 43,857 
  𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵, 𝑓𝑓, 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻, 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹, 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 , 𝜇𝜇1, 𝜇𝜇2, 𝑑𝑑, 𝛼𝛼 Same as Table 11 Same as Table 11 
  
Initial conditions in AD1700   
𝐿𝐿1
𝐻𝐻 Initial White population in American country 240,000 (240,000 + 22,000) × 0.0526 
𝐿𝐿1
𝐹𝐹 Initial Black population in American country 22,000 (240,000 + 22,000) × 0.9474 
𝑧𝑧1
𝐴𝐴 Initial technology level in American country 1.64 2.35 
  𝐿𝐿1𝐵𝐵, 𝑧𝑧1𝐵𝐵 Same as Table 11 Same as Table 11 
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FIGURE 1 
GeoPopulation-Institution hypothesis 
 
 
 
Note: Arrow 1 represents the “geography channel”, while arrow 2 represents the “population 
channel” and arrow 3 represents the “institution channel”.  See Figure 8 for further breakdown of 
GeoPopulation-Institution hypothesis. 
 
------------------------------------------------- 
FIGURE 2 
Real per capita income, the Thirteen Colonies/States, AD1650-AD1840 
                  A                                      B 
   
Source: Table 2 and Table 3, British per capita income in AD1820 and AD1840 are calculated from 
comparative per capita income levels between the United Kingdom and the United States in 
AD1820 and AD1840 respectively (Maddison 2008). 
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FIGURE 3 
Log per capita income in AD2008 against urbanization rate in AD1500,  
American countries 
 
 
 
Source: Maddison (2008) for per capita income in AD2008, Acemoglu et al. (2002) Appendix 3 
for urbanization rate in AD1500. 
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FIGURE 4 
Development paths, the Thirteen Colonies, AD1700-AD1780 
 
Note:  Solid (blue) lines: the benchmark economy.  The panels show evolution of (a) per capita 
income in the colony, (b) technology growth rate in the colony, (c) White population share in the 
colony, (d) number of White migrants to the colony, (e) number of Black slaves imported to the 
colony, and (f) per capita income in Britain during AD1700-AD1780.  (Blue) Dots show the 
implied data from Tables 2-7. 
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FIGURE 5 
Development paths, the Thirteen Colonies/United States with land acquisition, AD1700-AD1860 
 
Note:  Solid (blue) lines: the Thirteen Colonies/United States without land acquisition, 
parameters from Table 11, except 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 = 904,554  for all periods.  Dashed (red) lines: the 
Thirteen Colonies/United States with land acquisition, parameters from Table 11.  Dotted (green) 
lines: counterfactual Thirteen Colonies/United States with land expansion into regions with dense 
Indian population.  See Figure 4 for labels.   
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FIGURE 6 
Development paths, the Thirteen Colonies/United States with land acquisition 
and slavery trade abolition, AD1700-AD1860 
 
 
Note:  Solid (blue) lines: the Thirteen Colonies/United States without slavery trade abolition, 
parameters from Table 12, except 𝑓𝑓 = 0.0000226 for all periods.  Dashed (red) lines: the 
Thirteen Colonies/United States with slavery trade abolition, parameters from Table 12.  The 
panels show evolution of (a) per capita income in the colony, (b) technology growth rate in the 
colony, (c) number of White migrants to the colony, and (d) number of Black slaves imported to 
the colony.  (Blue) Dots show the implied data from Tables 2-7. 
 
  
70 
 
FIGURE 7 
Development paths, US-North and US-South, AD1700-AD1860 
 
Note:  Solid (blue) lines: US-North.  Dashed (red) lines: US-South, parameters from Table 13.  
See Figure 4 for labels.  (Blue) Dots are the implied US-North data, while (red) crosses are the 
implied US-South data from Tables 2-7. 
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FIGURE 8 
Breakdown of GeoPopulation-Institution hypothesis 
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FIGURE 9 
Development paths, the Thirteen Colonies/United States and West Indies, AD1700-AD1860 
 
Note:  Solid (blue) lines: the Thirteen Colonies/United States.  Dashed (red) lines: West Indies, 
parameter from Table 14.  See Figure 4 for labels.  (Blue) Dots are the implied Thirteen 
Colonies/United States data, while (red) crosses are the implied West Indies data from Tables 2-7. 
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FIGURE 10 
Development paths, “US-type country” and “Spanish-type country”, AD1700-AD1860 
 
 
Note:  Solid (blue) lines: “US-type country”.  Dashed (red) lines: “Spanish-type country”, 
parameter from Table 15.  See Figure 4 for labels in panels (a)-(c). 
 
------------------------------------------------- 
 
FIGURE 11 
Log per capita income in AD2008 against log per capita income in AD1870,  
American countries 
 
 
 
Source: Bolt and van Zanden (2013). 
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FIGURE A.1 
Intertemporal equilibrium with technological improvement in country A 
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